Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Multi-Winner Elections. - Umang Bhaskar; Varsha Dani; Abheek Ghosh (AAAI, 2018)

On the Welfare of Cardinal Voting Mechanisms. - Umang Bhaskar; Abheek Ghosh (FSTTCS, 2018)

Contest Design with Threshold Objectives. - Edith Elkind; Abheek Ghosh; Paul W. Goldberg (WINE, 2021)

Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation. - Edith Elkind; Abheek Ghosh; Paul Goldberg 001 (AAAI, 2022)

Contests to Incentivize a Target Group. - Edith Elkind; Abheek Ghosh; Paul W. Goldberg (IJCAI, 2022)

Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy. - Edith Elkind; Abheek Ghosh; Paul W. Goldberg (SAGT, 2022)

Contests and Other Topics in Multi-Agent Systems. - Abheek Ghosh (AAMAS, 2023)

Indexability is Not Enough for Whittle: Improved, Near-Optimal Algorithms for Restless Bandits. - Abheek Ghosh; Dheeraj Nagaraj; Manish Jain; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2023)

Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests. - Abheek Ghosh; Paul W. Goldberg (EC, 2023)

Best-Response Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs. - Abheek Ghosh (CoRR, 2023)

Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs. - Edith Elkind; Abheek Ghosh; Paul W. Goldberg (CoRR, 2024)

The Complexity of Symmetric Bimatrix Games with Common Payoffs. - Abheek Ghosh; Alexandros Hollender (CoRR, 2024)

Persuading a Credible Agent. - Jiarui Gan; Abheek Ghosh; Nicholas Teh (CoRR, 2024)