Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract). - Hessameddin Akhlaghpour; Mohammad Ghodsi; Nima Haghpanah; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Hamid Mahini; Afshin Nikzad (WINE, 2010)

Colorful Paths in Vertex Coloring of Graphs. - Saieed Akbari; Vahid Liaghat; Afshin Nikzad (Electron. J. Comb., 2011)

Optimal online pricing with network externalities. - Shayan Ehsani; Mohammad Ghodsi; Ahmad Khajenezhad; Hamid Mahini; Afshin Nikzad (Inf. Process. Lett., 2012)

Deliver or hold: Approximation Algorithms for the Periodic Inventory Routing Problem. - Takuro Fukunaga; Afshin Nikzad; R. Ravi 001 (APPROX-RANDOM, 2014)

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets. - Nima Anari; Gagan Goel; Afshin Nikzad (FOCS, 2014)

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks. - Gagan Goel; Afshin Nikzad; Adish Singla (HCOMP, 2014)

Sending Secrets Swiftly: Approximation Algorithms for Generalized Multicast Problems. - Afshin Nikzad; R. Ravi 001 (ICALP (2), 2014)

Allocating tasks to workers with matching constraints: truthful mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets. - Gagan Goel; Afshin Nikzad; Adish Singla (WWW (Companion Volume), 2014)

Mechanisms Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Approximate Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets. - Nima Anari; Gagan Goel; Afshin Nikzad (CoRR, 2014)

Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison. - Itai Ashlagi; Afshin Nikzad; Assaf Romm (EC, 2015)

Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising. - Gagan Goel; Stefano Leonardi 001; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Afshin Nikzad; Renato Paes Leme (ICALP, 2016)

What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design. - Itai Ashlagi; Afshin Nikzad (EC, 2016)

Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations. - Georgios Amanatidis; Evangelos Markakis; Afshin Nikzad; Amin Saberi (ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2017)

Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions. - Nima Anari; Gagan Goel; Afshin Nikzad (Oper. Res., 2018)

Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules. - Itai Ashlagi; Afshin Nikzad; Assaf Romm (Games Econ. Behav., 2019)

What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design. - Itai Ashlagi; Afshin Nikzad (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design. - Itai Ashlagi; Faidra Georgia Monachou; Afshin Nikzad (EC, 2021)

Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness. - Afshin Nikzad (Games Econ. Behav., 2021)

Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design. - Afshin Nikzad (EC, 2022)

Expressiveness, Cost, and Collectivism: How the Design of Preference Languages Shapes Participation in Algorithmic Decision-Making. - Samantha Robertson; Tonya Nguyen; Cathy Hu; Catherine Albiston; Afshin Nikzad; Niloufar Salehi (CHI, 2023)

Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics. - Afshin Nikzad (EC, 2024)

Equity and Efficiency in Dynamic Matching: Extreme Waitlist Policies. - Afshin Nikzad; Philipp Strack (Manag. Sci., 2024)

Generative AI in Knowledge Work: Design Implications for Data Navigation and Decision-Making. - Bhada Yun; Dana Feng; Ace S. Chen; Afshin Nikzad; Niloufar Salehi (CHI, 2025)