Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences. - Agustín G. Bonifacio (Soc. Choice Welf., 2015)

Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Elena Inarra; Pablo Neme (CoRR, 2020)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Jordi Massó (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219-238]. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Jordi Massó (Games Econ. Behav., 2021)

The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Nadia Guiñazú; Noelia Juárez; Pablo Neme; Jorge Oviedo (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Noelia Juárez; Pablo Neme; Jorge Oviedo (Math. Soc. Sci., 2022)

Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Nadia Guiñazú; Noelia Juárez; Pablo Neme; Jorge Oviedo (CoRR, 2024)

Lattice operations for the stable set in substitutable matching markets via re-equilibration dynamics. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Noelia Juárez; Paola B. Manasero (CoRR, 2024)

A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; María Elena Iñarra García; Pablo Neme (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. - Agustín G. Bonifacio (Math. Soc. Sci., 2024)

Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules. - R. Pablo Arribillaga; Agustín G. Bonifacio (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences. - Agustín G. Bonifacio; Noelia Juárez; Pablo Neme; Jorge Oviedo (Int. J. Game Theory, 2024)

Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences. - Agustín G. Bonifacio (Soc. Choice Welf., 2024)