Three essays in matching mechanism design. - Alexander S. Nesterov (2016)

Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms. - Alexander S. Nesterov (J. Econ. Theory, 2017)

Efficient lottery design. - Onur Kesten; Morimitsu Kurino; Alexander S. Nesterov (Soc. Choice Welf., 2017)

Measuring Majority Power and Veto Power of Voting Rules. - Aleksei Y. Kondratev; Alexander S. Nesterov (CoRR, 2018)

Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach. - Dmitry Ivanov; Alexander S. Nesterov (EC, 2019)

In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945-3 March 2021). - Anna Bogomolnaia; Misha Gavrilovich; Egor Ianovski; Galina Lyapunova; Hervé Moulin 001; Alexander S. Nesterov; Marina Sandomirskaia; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Elena Yanovskaya (Int. J. Game Theory, 2021)

Distantly supervised end-to-end medical entity extraction from electronic health records with human-level quality. - Alexander S. Nesterov; Dmitry Umerenkov (CoRR, 2022)

RuBioRoBERTa: a pre-trained biomedical language model for Russian language biomedical text mining. - Alexander Yalunin; Alexander S. Nesterov; Dmitriy Umerenkov (CoRR, 2022)

Minimal envy and popular matchings. - Aleksei Y. Kondratev; Alexander S. Nesterov (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2022)

Predicting COVID-19 and pneumonia complications from admission texts. - Dmitriy Umerenkov; Oleg Cherkashin; Alexander S. Nesterov; Victor Gombolevskiy; Irina Demko; Alexander Yalunin; Vladimir Kokh (CoRR, 2023)

How Should We Score Athletes and Candidates: Geometric Scoring Rules. - Aleksei Y. Kondratev; Egor Ianovski; Alexander S. Nesterov (Oper. Res., 2024)

Robustness to manipulations in school choice. - Alexander S. Nesterov; Olga Rospuskova; Sofia Rubtcova (Soc. Choice Welf., 2024)