The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing. - Dirk Bergemann; Alessandro Bonatti; Andreas A. Haupt; Alex Smolin (WINE, 2021)

Towards Psychologically-Grounded Dynamic Preference Models. - Mihaela Curmei; Andreas A. Haupt; Benjamin Recht; Dylan Hadfield-Menell (RecSys, 2022)

Contextually Private Mechanisms. - Andreas Alexander Haupt; Zoë Kettler Hitzig (EC, 2022)

Risk Aversion In Learning Algorithms and an Application To Recommendation Systems. - Andreas A. Haupt; Aroon Narayanan (CoRR, 2022)

Get It in Writing: Formal Contracts Mitigate Social Dilemmas in Multi-Agent RL. - Phillip J. K. Christoffersen; Andreas A. Haupt; Dylan Hadfield-Menell (AAMAS, 2023)

Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen McAleer; Andreas A. Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (NeurIPS, 2023)

Recommending to Strategic Users. - Andreas A. Haupt; Dylan Hadfield-Menell; Chara Podimata (CoRR, 2023)

Steering No-Regret Learners to Optimal Equilibria. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen Marcus McAleer; Andreas Alexander Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (CoRR, 2023)

Black-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous AI Audits. - Stephen Casper; Carson Ezell; Charlotte Siegmann; Noam Kolt; Taylor Lynn Curtis; Benjamin Bucknall; Andreas A. Haupt; Kevin Wei; Jérémy Scheurer; Marius Hobbhahn; Lee Sharkey; Satyapriya Krishna; et al. (FAccT, 2024)

Certification Design for a Competitive Market. - Andreas Alexander Haupt; Nicole Immorlica; Brendan Lucier (EC, 2024)

Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen McAleer; Andreas A. Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2024)

Risk preferences of learning algorithms. - Andreas A. Haupt; Aroon Narayanan (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

Formal contracts mitigate social dilemmas in multi-agent reinforcement learning. - Andreas A. Haupt; Phillip J. K. Christoffersen; Mehul Damani; Dylan Hadfield-Menell (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2024)