Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. - Andrzej Skrzypacz; Hugo Hopenhayn (J. Econ. Theory, 2004)

Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169]. - Andrzej Skrzypacz; Hugo Hopenhayn (J. Econ. Theory, 2004)

Dynamic signaling and market breakdown. - Ilan Kremer; Andrzej Skrzypacz (J. Econ. Theory, 2007)

Lattice games and the economics of aggregators. - Patrick R. Jordan; Uri Nadav; Kunal Punera; Andrzej Skrzypacz; George Varghese (WWW, 2012)

Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values. - William Fuchs; Andrzej Skrzypacz (J. Econ. Theory, 2013)

Limited records and reputation bubbles. - Qingmin Liu; Andrzej Skrzypacz (J. Econ. Theory, 2014)

Recall and private monitoring. - Christopher Phelan; Andrzej Skrzypacz (Games Econ. Behav., 2015)

Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection. - William Fuchs; Andrzej Skrzypacz (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution. - Matthew Mitchell; Andrzej Skrzypacz (Manag. Sci., 2015)

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design. - Martino Banchio; Andrzej Skrzypacz (EC, 2022)

Market Design for AI Algorithms. - Martino Banchio; Andrzej Skrzypacz (SIGecom Exch., 2022)

Dynamic Threats to Credible Auctions. - Martino Banchio; Andrzej Skrzypacz; Frank Yang (EC, 2025)