A Lower Bound of 1+phi for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms. - Elias Koutsoupias; Angelina Vidali (MFCS, 2007)

A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling. - George Christodoulou 001; Elias Koutsoupias; Angelina Vidali (ESA, 2008)

The Geometry of Truthfulness. - Angelina Vidali (WINE, 2009)

A Lower Bound for Scheduling Mechanisms. - George Christodoulou 001; Elias Koutsoupias; Angelina Vidali (Algorithmica, 2009)

Παιγνιοθεωρητική ανάλυση δικτύων - Angelina Vidali (2009)

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design under Budget and Matroid Constraints. - Monika Henzinger; Angelina Vidali (ESA, 2011)

Extending Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms from Subdomains to Domains. - Angelina Vidali (WINE, 2011)

A Complete Characterization of Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-Sharing. - Emmanouil Pountourakis; Angelina Vidali (Algorithmica, 2012)

Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms. - Amos Fiat; Anna R. Karlin; Elias Koutsoupias; Angelina Vidali (ITCS, 2013)

A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms. - Elias Koutsoupias; Angelina Vidali (Algorithmica, 2013)

Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time. - Vincent Conitzer; Angelina Vidali (AAAI, 2014)

A Characterization of n-Player Strongly Monotone Scheduling Mechanisms. - Annamária Kovács; Angelina Vidali (IJCAI, 2015)

Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre; Angelina Vidali (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020)