The Fewest Clues Problem. - Erik D. Demaine; Fermi Ma; Ariel Schvartzman; Erik Waingarten; Scott Aaronson (FUN, 2016)

Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all. - Mark Braverman; Sumegha Garg; Ariel Schvartzman (CoRR, 2016)

Coding in Undirected Graphs Is Either Very Helpful or Not Helpful at All. - Mark Braverman; Sumegha Garg; Ariel Schvartzman (ITCS, 2017)

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. - Jon Schneider; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (ITCS, 2017)

Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Two-Player Approximate Correlated Equilibria. - Young Kun-Ko; Ariel Schvartzman (Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2017)

The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. - Raghuvansh R. Saxena; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (SODA, 2018)

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. - Alexandros Psomas 001; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (EC, 2019)

Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. - Pravesh Kothari; Sahil Singla 001; Divyarthi Mohan; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (FOCS, 2019)

Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. - Pravesh Kothari; Divyarthi Mohan; Ariel Schvartzman; Sahil Singla 001; S. Matthew Weinberg (CoRR, 2019)

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. - Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg; Eitan Zlatin; Albert Zuo (ITCS, 2020)

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. - Nikhil R. Devanur; Kira Goldner; Raghuvansh R. Saxena; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (EC, 2020)

Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design - Ariel Schvartzman (2020)

On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. - Alexandros Psomas 001; Ariel Schvartzman; S. Matthew Weinberg (NeurIPS, 2022)

Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling. - Sepehr Assadi; Ariel Schvartzman (CoRR, 2022)

Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling. - Sepehr Assadi; Vikram Kher; George Li 002; Ariel Schvartzman (EC, 2023)

On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three. - David Miksaník; Ariel Schvartzman; Jan Soukup (ADT, 2024)

Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities. - David M. Pennock; Ariel Schvartzman; Eric Xue 001 (ADT, 2024)

Platform Competition in the Autobidding World. - Gagan Aggarwal; Andrés Perlroth; Ariel Schvartzman; Mingfei Zhao (CoRR, 2024)

Auto-Bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey. - Gagan Aggarwal; Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru; Santiago R. Balseiro; Kshipra Bhawalkar; Yuan Deng; Zhe Feng 004; Gagan Goel; Christopher Liaw; Haihao Lu; Mohammad Mahdian; Jieming Mao; Aranyak Mehta; et al. (SIGecom Exch., 2024)