Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling. - Shahar Dobzinski; Ariel Shaulker (CoRR, 2020)

Rigidity in Mechanism Design and Its Applications. - Shahar Dobzinski; Ariel Shaulker (ITCS, 2023)

Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values. - Shahar Dobzinski; Ariel Shaulker (STOC, 2024)

Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. - Tomer Ezra; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Ariel Shaulker (CoRR, 2024)

Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation. - Shahar Dobzinski; Alon Eden; Kira Goldner; Ariel Shaulker; Thodoris Tsilivis (EC, 2025)

Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. - Tomer Ezra; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Ariel Shaulker (STOC, 2025)

Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation. - Shahar Dobzinski; Alon Eden; Kira Goldner; Ariel Shaulker; Thodoris Tsilivis (CoRR, 2025)