Integrating clinical data from hospital databases. - Kostis Karozos; Iosif Spartalis; Artem Tsikiridis; Despoina Trivela; Vasilis Vassalos (SWH@ISWC, 2018)

On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions. - Evangelos Markakis; Artem Tsikiridis (WINE, 2019)

Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. - Georgios Birmpas; Evangelos Markakis; Orestis Telelis; Artem Tsikiridis (Theory Comput. Syst., 2019)

Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction. - Evangelos Markakis; Alkmini Sgouritsa; Artem Tsikiridis (WINE, 2021)

On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets. - Evangelos Markakis; Georgios Papasotiropoulos; Artem Tsikiridis (SAGT, 2022)

Design and analysis of auction mechanisms: algorithms and incentives - Artem Tsikiridis (2023)

To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model. - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi; Sophie Klumper; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (EC, 2024)

Pandora's Box Problem Over Time. - Georgios Amanatidis; Federico Fusco; Rebecca Reiffenhäuser; Artem Tsikiridis (CoRR, 2024)

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions. - Georgios Amanatidis; Evangelos Markakis; Christodoulos Santorinaios; Guido Schäfer; Panagiotis Tsamopoulos; Artem Tsikiridis (SAGT, 2025)

The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms. - Bart de Keijzer; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2025)

Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions. - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi; Sophie Klumper; Twan Kroll; Stefano Leonardi 001; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (CoRR, 2025)

Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. - Georgios Amanatidis; Sophie Klumper; Evangelos Markakis; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2025)