On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data. - Michel Regenwetter; Bernard Grofman; A. A. J. Marley (Math. Soc. Sci., 2002)

A general concept of majority rule. - Michel Regenwetter; A. A. J. Marley; Bernard Grofman (Math. Soc. Sci., 2002)

Factor analysis versus multi-dimensional scaling: binary choice roll-call voting and the US Supreme Court. - Timothy J. Brazill; Bernard Grofman (Soc. Networks, 2002)

General concepts of value restriction and preference majority. - Michel Regenwetter; A. A. J. Marley; Bernard Grofman (Soc. Choice Welf., 2003)

The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. - Ilia Tsetlin; Michel Regenwetter; Bernard Grofman (Soc. Choice Welf., 2003)

Behavioral Social Choice - Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications. - Michel Regenwetter; Bernard Grofman; A. A. J. Marley; Ilia Tsetlin (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems. - Guillermo Owen; Ines Lindner; Scott L. Feld; Bernard Grofman; Leonard Ray (Int. J. Game Theory, 2006)

Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions. - Guillermo Owen; Bernard Grofman (Soc. Choice Welf., 2006)

Behavioural social choice: a status report. - Michel Regenwetter; Bernard Grofman; Anna Popova; William Messner; Clintin P. Davis-Stober; Daniel R. Cavagnaro (ISAIM, 2012)

In quest of the banks set in spatial voting games. - Scott L. Feld; Joseph Godfrey; Bernard Grofman (Soc. Choice Welf., 2013)

Finding the Threshold of Exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: Illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules. - Bernard Grofman; Scott L. Feld; Jon Fraenkel (Math. Soc. Sci., 2017)

Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules. - Haris Aziz 001; Piotr Faliszewski; Bernard Grofman; Arkadii Slinko; Nimrod Talmon (IJCAI, 2018)