Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: combining MSTs with shortest-path trees. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (PE-WASUN, 2004)

Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (SIROCCO, 2004)

More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (WAOA, 2004)

Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (SIROCCO, 2005)

Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents. - Alessandro Ferrante; Gennaro Parlato; Francesco Sorrentino 002; Carmine Ventre (WAOA, 2005)

New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification. - Vincenzo Auletta; Roberto De Prisco; Paolo Penna; Giuseppe Persiano; Carmine Ventre (ICALP (1), 2006)

The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (STACS, 2006)

Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain. - Carmine Ventre (WINE, 2006)

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (ESA, 2008)

Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited. - Carmine Ventre; Ivan Visconti (Public Key Cryptography, 2008)

Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize. - Vincenzo Auletta; Paolo Penna; Giuseppe Persiano; Carmine Ventre (SAGT, 2008)

Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys. - Carmine Ventre; Ivan Visconti (AFRICACRYPT, 2009)

On the Price of Anarchy of Restricted Job Scheduling Games. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (ICTCS, 2009)

Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. - Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (EC, 2009)

On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers. - Patrick Briest; Martin Hoefer 001; Luciano Gualà; Carmine Ventre (WINE, 2009)

Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. - Alessandro Ferrante; Gennaro Parlato; Francesco Sorrentino 002; Carmine Ventre (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2009)

Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable. - Piotr Krysta; Carmine Ventre (ESA (2), 2010)

Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. - Leslie Ann Goldberg; Paul W. Goldberg; Piotr Krysta; Carmine Ventre (EC, 2010)

Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization. - Fabrizio Grandoni 001; Piotr Krysta; Stefano Leonardi 001; Carmine Ventre (SODA, 2010)

On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games. - Paul W. Goldberg; Rahul Savani; Troels Bjerre Sørensen; Carmine Ventre (ESA, 2011)

A response to "Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle". - Vincenzo Auletta; Paolo Penna; Giuseppe Persiano; Carmine Ventre (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011)

Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games. - Diodato Ferraioli; Paul W. Goldberg; Carmine Ventre (SAGT, 2012)

Metastability of Potential Games - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2012)

On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. - Patrick Briest; Luciano Gualà; Martin Hoefer 001; Carmine Ventre (Networks, 2012)

Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue. - Paul W. Goldberg; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2013)

Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods. - Piotr Krysta; Orestis Telelis; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2013)

Combinatorial auctions without money. - Dimitris Fotakis 001; Piotr Krysta; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2014)

Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2014)

Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money on the Line. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (ECAI, 2014)

Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. - Fabrizio Grandoni 001; Piotr Krysta; Stefano Leonardi 001; Carmine Ventre (SIAM J. Comput., 2014)

Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. - Carmine Ventre (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2014)

A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre; Gabor Aranyi (AAAI, 2015)

Truthful Mechanisms without Money for Non-Utilitarian Heterogeneous Facility Location. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (AAAI, 2015)

The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. - Dimitris Fotakis 001; Piotr Krysta; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2015)

Cascade Model with Contextual Externalities and Bounded User Memory for Sponsored Search Auctions. - Nicola Gatti 001; Marco Rocco; Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2015)

Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. - Piotr Krysta; Orestis Telelis; Carmine Ventre (IJCAI, 2015)

Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games - (Extended Abstract). - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (MFCS (2), 2015)

Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation. - Annamária Kovács; Ulrich Meyer 001; Carmine Ventre (WINE, 2015)

What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money. - Diodato Ferraioli; Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2016)

Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. - Nicola Gatti 001; Marco Rocco; Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (ECAI, 2016)

Heterogeneous facility location without money. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2016)

Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (AAAI, 2017)

Social Pressure in Opinion Games. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (IJCAI, 2017)

Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (IJCAI, 2018)

On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms. - Diodato Ferraioli; Adrian Meier; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2018)

How to Get the Most from Goods Donated to Charities. - Christopher Culley; Ji Qi; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2019)

Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2019)

Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling. - Maria Kyropoulou; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2019)

Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre; Angelina Vidali (AAMAS, 2019)

Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. - Diodato Ferraioli; Adrian Meier; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (ESA, 2019)

Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance. - Paolo Serafino; Carmine Ventre; Long Tran-Thanh; Jie Zhang 008; Bo An 001; Nick R. Jennings (PRICAI (2), 2019)

Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation - The Case of Machine Scheduling. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (SAGT, 2019)

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location. - Maria Kyropoulou; Carmine Ventre; Xiaomeng Zhang (SAGT, 2019)

Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small Domains. - Diodato Ferraioli; Adrian Meier; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (WINE, 2019)

Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2019)

Social pressure in opinion dynamics. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2019)

Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model. - Zheng Gong; Carmine Ventre; John G. O'Hara (ICAIF, 2020)

Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. - Bart de Keijzer; Maria Kyropoulou; Carmine Ventre (ICALP, 2020)

Novel Paradigm for the design of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. - Diodato Ferraioli; Adrian Meier; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (ICTCS, 2020)

Ascertaining price formation in cryptocurrency markets with DeepLearning. - Fan Fang; Waichung Chung; Carmine Ventre; Michail Basios; Leslie Kanthan; Lingbo Li 001; Fan Wu 009 (CoRR, 2020)

Cryptocurrency Trading: A Comprehensive Survey. - Fan Fang; Carmine Ventre; Michail Basios; Hoiliong Kong; Leslie Kanthan; Lingbo Li 001; David Martínez-Rego; Fan Wu 009 (CoRR, 2020)

Better Model Selection with a new Definition of Feature Importance. - Fan Fang; Carmine Ventre; Lingbo Li 001; Leslie Kanthan; Fan Wu 009; Michail Basios (CoRR, 2020)

Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring. - Dimitris Fotakis 001; Piotr Krysta; Carmine Ventre (AAAI, 2021)

Call Markets with Adaptive Clearing Intervals. - Buhong Liu; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre; Lingbo Li 001; Leslie Kanthan (AAMAS, 2021)

The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks. - Zheng Gong; Carmine Ventre; John G. O'Hara (ICAIF, 2021)

Agent-based markets: equilibrium strategies and robustness. - Buhong Liu; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre; Lingbo Li 001; Leslie Kanthan (ICAIF, 2021)

Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. - Diodato Ferraioli; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (WINE, 2021)

Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (Algorithmica, 2021)

Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Financial Derivatives. - Stavros D. Ioannidis; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2021)

The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets. - Buhong Liu; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre; Lingbo Li 001; Leslie Kanthan; Fan Wu 009; Michail Basios (AAMAS, 2022)

Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation. - Yuanzi Zhu; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2022)

Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures. - Andrew Alden; Carmine Ventre; Blanka Horvath; Gordon Lee (ICAIF, 2022)

Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading. - Chunli Liu; Carmine Ventre; Maria Polukarov (ICAIF, 2022)

Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning. - Yanqing Ma; Carmine Ventre; Maria Polukarov (ICAIF, 2022)

Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets. - Ji Qi; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2022)

Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives. - Stavros D. Ioannidis; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (ICALP, 2022)

Accounting for Strategic Response in Limit Order Book Dynamics. - Ji Qi; Carmine Ventre (PRIMA, 2022)

Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities. - Stavros D. Ioannidis; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (SAGT, 2022)

Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence. - Elizabeth Black; Martim Brandão; Oana Cocarascu; Bart de Keijzer; Yali Du 001; Derek Long; Michael Luck; Peter McBurney; Albert Meroño-Peñuela; Simon Miles; Sanjay Modgil; Luc Moreau 001; et al. (AI Commun., 2022)

Information Loss in Euclidean Preference Models. - Luke Thorburn; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2022)

Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (DP@AI*IA, 2023)

Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade. - Thomas Archbold; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2023)

Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2023)

Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools. - Haochen Li; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2023)

Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote. - Ziyi Wang; Carmine Ventre; Maria Polukarov (ICAIF, 2023)

Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks. - Lingxiao Zhao; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2023)

Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents. - Thomas Archbold; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (IJCAI, 2023)

Error in the Euclidean Preference Model. - Luke Thorburn; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (IJCAI, 2023)

On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (EC, 2023)

Clearing Financial Networks with Derivatives: From Intractability to Algorithms. - Stavros D. Ioannidis; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2023)

New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. - Diodato Ferraioli; Adrian Meier; Paolo Penna; Carmine Ventre (Math. Oper. Res., 2023)

Willy Wonka Mechanisms. - Thomas Archbold; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2024)

Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism. - Pedro Braga; Georgios Chionas; Piotr Krysta; Stefanos Leonardos; Georgios Piliouras; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2024)

MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates. - Pedro Braga; Georgios Chionas; Piotr Krysta; Stefanos Leonardos; Georgios Piliouras; Carmine Ventre (DeFi@CCS, 2024)

Selfishly Cancelling Debts Can Reduce Systemic Risk. - Jinyun Tong; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (ECAI, 2024)

Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks through Donations. - Jinyun Tong; Bart de Keijzer; Carmine Ventre (ECAI, 2024)

Detecting Collective Liquidity Taking Distributions. - Andrei-Bogdan Balcau; Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt; Stefan Sarkadi; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2024)

A Financial Time Series Denoiser Based on Diffusion Models. - Zhuohan Wang; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2024)

ARL-Based Multi-Action Market Making with Hawkes Processes and Variable Volatility. - Ziyi Wang; Carmine Ventre; Maria Polukarov (ICAIF, 2024)

To Compete or Collude: Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions. - Fei Wu; Thomas Thiery; Stefanos Leonardos; Carmine Ventre (ICAIF, 2024)

Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions. - Fei Wu; Thomas Thiery; Stefanos Leonardos; Carmine Ventre (ICBC, 2024)

Equilibria of Carbon Allowance Auctions: Emissions and Productivity. - Lingxiao Zhao; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (PRIMA, 2024)

Societal Sorting as a Systemic Risk of Recommenders. - Luke Thorburn; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (RecSys, 2024)

Algorithms for Claims Trading. - Martin Hoefer 001; Carmine Ventre; Lisa Wilhelmi (STACS, 2024)

On the Redistribution of Maximal Extractable Value: A Dynamic Mechanism. - Pedro Braga; Georgios Chionas; Stefanos Leonardos; Piotr Krysta; Georgios Piliouras; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2024)

An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design. - Diodato Ferraioli; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2024)

A Financial Time Series Denoiser Based on Diffusion Model. - Zhuohan Wang; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2024)

Scalable Signature-Based Distribution Regression via Reference Sets. - Andrew Alden; Carmine Ventre; Blanka Horvath (CoRR, 2024)

From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block Building Auctions. - Fei Wu; Thomas Thiery; Stefanos Leonardos; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2024)

Thermodynamic Analysis of Financial Markets: Measuring Order Book Dynamics with Temperature and Entropy. - Haochen Li; Yue Xiao; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (Entropy, 2024)

Asymptotic Extinction in Large Coordination Games. - Desmond Chan; Bart de Keijzer; Tobias Galla; Stefanos Leonardos; Carmine Ventre (AAAI, 2025)

Impact of Pinging in Financial Markets: An Agent Based Study. - Sriram Bharadwaj Rangarajan; Carmine Ventre (ICAART (1), 2025)

Bitcoin's Edge: Embedded Sentiment in Blockchain Transactional Data. - Charalampos Kleitsikas; Nikolaos Korfiatis; Stefanos Leonardos; Carmine Ventre (ICBC, 2025)

Agent-based Modeling and Simulation of Ambiguity in Catastrophe Insurance Markets. - Yu Bi; Lingxiao Zhao; Jinyun Tong; Zhe Feng; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2025)

Agent-Based Analysis of Green Disclosure Policies and Their Market-Wide Impact on Firm Behavior. - Lingxiao Zhao; Maria Polukarov; Carmine Ventre (AAMAS, 2025)

Deep Generative Calibration on Stochastic Volatility Models with Applications in FX Barrier Options. - Yanqing Ma; Carmine Ventre; Renzo Tiranti; Aiming Chen (SAC, 2025)

Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling. - Maria Kyropoulou; Carmine Ventre (SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2025)

The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms. - Bart de Keijzer; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2025)

DiffVolume: Diffusion Models for Volume Generation in Limit Order Books. - Zhuohan Wang; Carmine Ventre (CoRR, 2025)

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Market Making: Competition without Collusion. - Ziyi Wang; Carmine Ventre; Maria Polukarov (CoRR, 2025)