Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics. - Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat; Wolfgang Windsteiger (Calculemus/MKM, 2011)

A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games. - Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat (Int. J. Game Theory, 2011)

Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees. - Ian Ayres; Colin Rowat; Nasser Zakariya (Soc. Choice Welf., 2011)

Applying Mechanised Reasoning in Economics - Making Reasoners Applicable for Domain Experts. - Christoph Lange 002; Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat (GI-Jahrestagung, 2013)

A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory. - Christoph Lange 002; Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Till Mossakowski; Colin Rowat; Makarius Wenzel; Wolfgang Windsteiger (MKM/Calculemus/DML, 2013)

The ForMaRE Project - Formal Mathematical Reasoning in Economics. - Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat; Manfred Kerber (MKM/Calculemus/DML, 2013)

Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code. - Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (CoRR, 2013)

Set Theory or Higher Order Logic to Represent Auction Concepts in Isabelle? - Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (CICM, 2014)

Budget Imbalance Criteria for Auctions: A Formalized Theorem. - Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat (CoRR, 2014)

Foreword. - Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (Math. Comput. Sci., 2014)

Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games. - Colin Rowat; Manfred Kerber (Math. Soc. Sci., 2014)

Sound Auction Specification and Implementation. - Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (EC, 2015)

VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions. - Marco B. Caminati; Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (Arch. Formal Proofs, 2015)

Pillage games with multiple stable sets. - Simon Mackenzie; Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat (Int. J. Game Theory, 2015)

An Introduction to Mechanized Reasoning. - Manfred Kerber; Christoph Lange 002; Colin Rowat (CoRR, 2016)

Asymmetric Shapley values: incorporating causal knowledge into model-agnostic explainability. - Christopher Frye; Colin Rowat; Ilya Feige (NeurIPS, 2020)

Interpretability in Safety-Critical FinancialTrading Systems. - Gabriel Deza; Adelin Travers; Colin Rowat; Nicolas Papernot (CoRR, 2021)

Joint Shapley values: a measure of joint feature importance. - Chris Harris; Richard Pymar; Colin Rowat (ICLR, 2022)

Asymmetric majority pillage games. - Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat; Naoki Yoshihara (Int. J. Game Theory, 2023)