On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives. - Fuad Aleskerov; Daniel Karabekyan; M. Remzi Sanver; Vyacheslav Yakuba (Math. Soc. Sci., 2012)

Manipulability of Aggregation Procedures in Impartial Anonymous Culture. - Fuad Aleskerov; Alexander Ivanov; Daniel Karabekyan; Vyacheslav Yakuba (ITQM, 2015)

Manipulability of majoritarian rules by coalitions with the same first-ranked alternative. - Fuad Aleskerov; Daniel Karabekyan; Alexander Ivanov; Vyacheslav Yakuba (ITQM, 2017)

Manipulability of Majority Relation-Based Collective Decision Rules. - Fuad Aleskerov; Alexander Ivanov; Daniel Karabekyan; Vyacheslav Yakuba (KES-IDT (1), 2017)

Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences. - Fuad Aleskerov; Daniel Karabekyan; Alexander Ivanov; Vyacheslav Yakuba (ITQM, 2018)

On the bounds of weak manipulability of majoritarian aggregation procedures. - Fuad Aleskerov; Daniel Karabekyan; Alexander Ivanov; Vyacheslav Yakuba (ITQM, 2019)

Manipulability of Majoritarian Procedures in Two-Dimensional Downsian Model. - Daniel Karabekyan; Vyacheslav Yakuba (GDN, 2020)

Vote'n'Rank: Revision of Benchmarking with Social Choice Theory. - Mark Rofin; Vladislav Mikhailov; Mikhail Florinsky; Andrey Kravchenko; Tatiana Shavrina; Elena Tutubalina; Daniel Karabekyan; Ekaterina Artemova (EACL, 2023)

Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model. - Daniel Karabekyan; Viacheslav Yakuba (GDN, 2024)