Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. - Artem Baklanov; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (AAAI, 2021)

PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. - Artem Baklanov; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (IJCAI, 2021)

Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Rishi Patel; Emmanouil Pountourakis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (SAGT, 2021)

Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. - Ioannis Caragiannis; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Alexandros Psomas 001; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (AAMAS, 2022)

Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond. - Giorgos Christodoulou 001; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (ITCS, 2022)

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. - Eric Balkanski; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Xizhi Tan (SODA, 2022)

Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. - Tomer Ezra; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Ariel Shaulker (CoRR, 2024)

On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. - Shiri Ron; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (AAAI, 2025)

A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events. - Chun Lau; David Pennock; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (SAGT, 2025)

Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Xizhi Tan (SODA, 2025)

Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. - Tomer Ezra; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Ariel Shaulker (STOC, 2025)

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. - Michal Feldman; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Nick Gravin; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (Oper. Res., 2025)