Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique. - Umang Bhaskar; Lisa Fleischer; Darrell Hoy; Chien-Chung Huang 001 (SODA, 2009)

Coopetitive Ad Auctions - Darrell Hoy; Kamal Jain; Christopher A. Wilkens (CoRR, 2012)

Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents. - Hu Fu 001; Jason D. Hartline; Darrell Hoy (EC, 2013)

A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. - Darrell Hoy; Kamal Jain; Christopher A. Wilkens (EC, 2013)

Price of anarchy for auction revenue. - Jason D. Hartline; Darrell Hoy; Sam Taggart (EC, 2014)

Price of Anarchy for Revenue. - Jason D. Hartline; Darrell Hoy; Sam Taggart (CoRR, 2014)

Approximately Optimal Risk-Averse Routing Policies via Adaptive Discretization. - Darrell Hoy; Evdokia Nikolova (AAAI, 2015)

Robust Data-Driven Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions. - Darrell Hoy; Denis Nekipelov; Vasilis Syrgkanis (CoRR, 2015)

On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Atomic Splittable Routing Games. - Umang Bhaskar; Lisa Fleischer; Darrell Hoy; Chien-Chung Huang 001 (Math. Oper. Res., 2015)

On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers. - Darrell Hoy; Nicole Immorlica; Brendan Lucier (WINE, 2016)

Welfare Guarantees from Data. - Darrell Hoy; Denis Nekipelov; Vasilis Syrgkanis (NIPS, 2017)

A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions. - Darrell Hoy; Samuel Taggart; Zihe Wang 001 (STOC, 2018)

An improved welfare guarantee for first-price auctions. - Darrell Hoy; Sam Taggart; Zihe Wang 001 (SIGecom Exch., 2018)

Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria. - Jason D. Hartline; Darrell Hoy; Samuel Taggart (CoRR, 2023)