Chapter 12 Market microstructure. - David A. Easley; Maureen O'Hara (Finance, 1995)

Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Optimal guessing: Choice in complex environments. - David A. Easley; Aldo Rustichini (J. Econ. Theory, 2005)

Redoing the Foundations of Decision Theory. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Joseph Y. Halpern (KR, 2006)

A New Start: Innovative Introductory AI-Centered Courses at Cornell. - Eric Breck; David A. Easley; K.-Y. Daisy Fan; Jon M. Kleinberg; Lillian Lee; Jennifer Wofford; Ramin Zabih (AAAI Spring Symposium: Using AI to Motivate Greater Participation in Computer Science, 2008)

Trading networks with price-setting agents. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Jon M. Kleinberg; Éva Tardos (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

Networks, Crowds, and Markets - Reasoning About a Highly Connected World. - David A. Easley; Jon M. Kleinberg (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Which Networks are Least Susceptible to Cascading Failures? - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Jon M. Kleinberg; Robert Kleinberg; Éva Tardos (FOCS, 2011)

Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Jon M. Kleinberg; Robert Kleinberg; Éva Tardos (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013)

Notes from the EC'14 program chairs. - Vincent Conitzer; David A. Easley (SIGecom Exch., 2014)

Introduction to computer science and economic theory. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Jon M. Kleinberg; Robert D. Kleinberg; Éva Tardos (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Loss aversion, survival and asset prices. - David A. Easley; Liyan Yang (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Behavioral mechanism design: optimal crowdsourcing contracts and prospect theory. - David A. Easley; Arpita Ghosh (SIGecom Exch., 2015)

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14. - Vincent Conitzer; David A. Easley (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016)

Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design. - David A. Easley; Arpita Ghosh (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016)

A case for incomplete markets. - Lawrence E. Blume; Timothy Cogley; David A. Easley; Thomas J. Sargent; Viktor Tsyrennikov (J. Econ. Theory, 2018)

Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies. - Soumya Basu 003; David A. Easley; Maureen O'Hara; Emin Gün Sirer (CoRR, 2019)

Constructive decision theory. - Lawrence E. Blume; David A. Easley; Joseph Y. Halpern (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)

StableFees: A Predictable Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies. - Soumya Basu 003; David A. Easley; Maureen O'Hara; Emin Gün Sirer (Manag. Sci., 2023)

Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners. - David A. Easley; Yoav Kolumbus; Éva Tardos (EC, 2025)

Learning in Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners. - David A. Easley; Yoav Kolumbus; Éva Tardos (CoRR, 2025)