Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design. - David C. Parkes; Lyle H. Ungar; Dean P. Foster (AMET, 1998)

Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. - David C. Parkes (Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop), 1999)

iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction. - David C. Parkes (EC, 1999)

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. - David C. Parkes; Lyle H. Ungar (AAAI/IAAI, 2000)

Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. - David C. Parkes; Lyle H. Ungar (AAAI/IAAI, 2000)

An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. - David C. Parkes; Lyle H. Ungar (Agents, 2001)

Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. - David C. Parkes; Jayant Kalagnanam; Marta Eso (IJCAI, 2001)

Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection. - David C. Parkes; Bernardo A. Huberman (Games Econ. Behav., 2001)

Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions. - David C. Parkes (AMEC, 2002)

Conference report: the third ACM conference on electronic commerce. - David C. Parkes (SIGecom Exch., 2002)

Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. - William E. Walsh; David C. Parkes; Rajarshi Das (AMEC, 2003)

Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. - Jeffrey Shneidman; David C. Parkes (IPTPS, 2003)

An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. - David C. Parkes; Satinder Singh 001 (NIPS, 2003)

Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. - Eric J. Friedman; David C. Parkes (EC, 2003)

Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. - Anshul Kothari; David C. Parkes; Subhash Suri (EC, 2003)

Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. - Chaki Ng; David C. Parkes; Margo I. Seltzer (EC, 2003)

Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. - Jeffrey Shneidman; David C. Parkes (EC, 2003)

Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. - Aditya V. Sunderam; David C. Parkes (EC, 2003)

Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. - Rajdeep K. Dash; Nicholas R. Jennings; David C. Parkes (IEEE Intell. Syst., 2003)

GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. - David C. Parkes; Grant Schoenebeck (AAAI, 2004)

An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. - Adam I. Juda; David C. Parkes (AMEC, 2004)

Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations. - Loizos Michael; David C. Parkes; Avi Pfeffer (AMEC, 2004)

Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. - David C. Parkes; Jeffrey Shneidman (AAMAS, 2004)

Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design. - David C. Parkes; Satinder Singh 001; Dimah Yanovsky (NIPS, 2004)

Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. - Jeffrey Shneidman; David C. Parkes (PODC, 2004)

Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi; Robert D. Kleinberg; David C. Parkes (EC, 2004)

Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. - Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes (EC, 2004)

Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks. - Geoffrey Mainland; Laura Kang; Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes; Matt Welsh (ACM SIGOPS European Workshop, 2004)

Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda. - David C. Parkes (BNAIC, 2005)

Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. - Jeffrey Shneidman; Chaki Ng; David C. Parkes; Alvin AuYoung; Alex C. Snoeren; Amin Vahdat; Brent N. Chun (HotOS, 2005)

More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. - Sébastien Lahaie; Florin Constantin; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2005)

Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. - Geoffrey Mainland; David C. Parkes; Matt Welsh (NSDI, 2005)

The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. - Jacomo Corbo; David C. Parkes (PODC, 2005)

Online auctions with re-usable goods. - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi; Robert D. Kleinberg; Mohammad Mahdian; David C. Parkes (EC, 2005)

ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. - David C. Parkes; Ruggiero Cavallo; Nick Elprin; Adam I. Juda; Sébastien Lahaie; Benjamin Lubin; Loizos Michael; Jeffrey Shneidman; Hassan Sultan (EC, 2005)

Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. - Jonathan Bredin; David C. Parkes (UAI, 2005)

Auction design with costly preference elicitation. - David C. Parkes (Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 2005)

Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions. - Anshul Kothari; David C. Parkes; Subhash Suri (Decis. Support Syst., 2005)

Special Issue of Decision Support Systems on the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. - David C. Parkes (Decis. Support Syst., 2005)

Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions. - David C. Parkes; Jayant Kalagnanam (Manag. Sci., 2005)

Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments. - Laura Kang; David C. Parkes (ICEC, 2006)

Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. - Takayuki Ito 001; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2006)

MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. - Adrian Petcu; Boi Faltings; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2006)

The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution. - Adam I. Juda; David C. Parkes (EC, 2006)

Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. - Ruggiero Cavallo; David C. Parkes; Satinder Singh 001 (UAI, 2006)

A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks. - Jacomo Corbo; Antoni Calvó-Armengol; David C. Parkes (ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 2006)

An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. - David C. Parkes; Quang Duong (AAAI, 2007)

Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. - Florin Constantin; Takayuki Ito 001; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2007)

On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. - Florin Constantin; David C. Parkes (AMEC/TADA, 2007)

Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. - Christopher Thorpe; David C. Parkes (Financial Cryptography, 2007)

The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. - Jacomo Corbo; Antoni Calvó-Armengol; David C. Parkes (WINE, 2007)

The Internet, evolutionary variational inequalities, and the time-dependent Braess paradox. - Anna Nagurney; David C. Parkes; Patrizia Daniele (Comput. Manag. Sci., 2007)

Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents. - Jonathan Bredin; David C. Parkes; Quang Duong (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2007)

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. - Debasis Mishra; David C. Parkes (J. Econ. Theory, 2007)

AAMAS 2008. - David C. Parkes; Lin Padgham (Künstliche Intell., 2007)

Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. - Craig Boutilier; David C. Parkes; Tuomas Sandholm; William E. Walsh (AAAI, 2008)

Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. - Ruggiero Cavallo; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2008)

An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. - Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes; David M. Pennock (AAAI, 2008)

Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. - Erik G. Schultink; Ruggiero Cavallo; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2008)

Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. - Sven Seuken; Ruggiero Cavallo; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2008)

Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. - William E. Walsh; David C. Parkes; Tuomas Sandholm; Craig Boutilier (AAAI, 2008)

Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. - Haoqi Zhang; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2008)

Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. - Mark Klein 003; Gabriel A. Moreno; David C. Parkes; Daniel Plakosh; Sven Seuken; Kurt C. Wallnau (NetEcon, 2008)

On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. - Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes (EC, 2008)

Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. - Sevan G. Ficici; David C. Parkes; Avi Pfeffer (UAI, 2008)

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. - Shaili Jain; David C. Parkes (WINE, 2008)

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. - David C. Parkes; Michael O. Rabin; Stuart M. Shieber; Christopher Thorpe (Electron. Commer. Res. Appl., 2008)

Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. - Shien Jin Ong; David C. Parkes; Alon Rosen; Salil P. Vadhan (IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2008)

ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange. - Benjamin Lubin; Adam I. Juda; Ruggiero Cavallo; Sébastien Lahaie; Jeffrey Shneidman; David C. Parkes (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2008)

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems. - Adrian Petcu; Boi Faltings; David C. Parkes (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2008)

A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. - Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes (SIGecom Exch., 2008)

Fair Package Assignment. - Sébastien Lahaie; David C. Parkes (AMMA, 2009)

On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. - Julien Freudiger; Mohammad Hossein Manshaei; Jean-Pierre Hubaux; David C. Parkes (CCS, 2009)

Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. - David C. Parkes; Michael O. Rabin; Christopher Thorpe (Financial Cryptography, 2009)

Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. - Christopher Thorpe; David C. Parkes (Financial Cryptography, 2009)

Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. - Benjamin Lubin; Jeffrey O. Kephart; Rajarshi Das; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2009)

A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. - Haoqi Zhang; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2009)

An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. - Jacomo Corbo; Shaili Jain; Michael Mitzenmacher; David C. Parkes (INFOCOM, 2009)

The role of game theory in human computation systems. - Shaili Jain; David C. Parkes (KDD Workshop on Human Computation, 2009)

A market-based approach to software evolution. - David F. Bacon; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes; Malvika Rao (OOPSLA Companion, 2009)

Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. - Florin Constantin; David C. Parkes (EC, 2009)

Policy teaching through reward function learning. - Haoqi Zhang; David C. Parkes; Yiling Chen 001 (EC, 2009)

When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. - David C. Parkes (SOFSEM, 2009)

Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. - Benjamin Lubin; David C. Parkes (UAI, 2009)

An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem. - Adam I. Juda; David C. Parkes (Artif. Intell., 2009)

Computational challenges in e-commerce. - Joan Feigenbaum; David C. Parkes; David M. Pennock (Commun. ACM, 2009)

Minimal Economic Distributed Computing - Saul Youssef; John Brunelle; John Huth; David C. Parkes; Margo I. Seltzer; Jim Shank (CoRR, 2009)

Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. - Debasis Mishra; David C. Parkes (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. - David C. Parkes; Moshe Tennenholtz (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

Hidden Market Design. - Sven Seuken; Kamal Jain; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2010)

Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. - Sven Seuken; Jie Tang; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2010)

Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. - William E. Walsh; Craig Boutilier; Tuomas Sandholm; Rob Shields; George L. Nemhauser; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2010)

Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. - James Y. Zou; Sujit Gujar; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2010)

Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. - Jie Tang; Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2010)

Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. - Sujit Gujar; David C. Parkes (ECAI, 2010)

Toward automatic task design: a progress report. - Eric Huang; Haoqi Zhang; David C. Parkes; Krzysztof Z. Gajos; Yiling Chen 001 (HCOMP@KDD, 2010)

Software economies. - David F. Bacon; Eric Bokelberg; Yiling Chen 001; Ian A. Kash; David C. Parkes; Malvika Rao; Manu Sridharan (FoSER, 2010)

Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering. - Mark Klein 003; Gabriel A. Moreno; David C. Parkes; Kurt C. Wallnau (FoSER, 2010)

Security Games in Online Advertising: Can Ads Help Secure the Web? - Nevena Vratonjic; Jean-Pierre Hubaux; Maxim Raya; David C. Parkes (WEIS, 2010)

Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. - Ian A. Kash; David C. Parkes (WINE, 2010)

Specifying and monitoring economic environments using rights and obligations. - Loizos Michael; David C. Parkes; Avi Pfeffer (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2010)

Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms. - David C. Parkes; Ruggiero Cavallo; Florin Constantin; Satinder Singh 001 (AI Mag., 2010)

Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions. - Pavithra Harsha; Cynthia Barnhart; David C. Parkes; Haoqi Zhang (Comput. Oper. Res., 2010)

Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. - Yuga J. Cohler; John K. Lai; David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia (AAAI, 2011)

On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions. - Florin Constantin; Malvika Rao; Chien-Chung Huang 001; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2011)

Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. - Jens Witkowski; Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2011)

An Online Mechanism for Multi-speed Electric Vehicle Charging. - Valentin Robu; Sebastian Stein 001; Enrico H. Gerding; David C. Parkes; Alex Rogers; Nicholas R. Jennings (AMMA, 2011)

Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). - Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes; Eric Horvitz; Kamal Jain; Mary Czerwinski; Desney S. Tan (AMMA, 2011)

Incentive design for adaptive agents. - Yiling Chen 001; Jerry Kung; David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia; Haoqi Zhang (AAMAS, 2011)

Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging. - Enrico H. Gerding; Valentin Robu; Sebastian Stein 001; David C. Parkes; Alex Rogers; Nicholas R. Jennings (AAMAS, 2011)

Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. - Shaili Jain; David C. Parkes (SAGT, 2011)

Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. - Paul Dütting; Felix A. Fischer; David C. Parkes (EC, 2011)

A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. - Panagiotis Toulis; David C. Parkes (EC, 2011)

Journals for certification, conferences for rapid dissemination. - Joseph Y. Halpern; David C. Parkes (Commun. ACM, 2011)

Complex financial products: caveat emptor: technical perspective. - David C. Parkes (Commun. ACM, 2011)

Viewpoint: Journals for Certification, Conferences for Rapid Dissemination - Joseph Y. Halpern; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2011)

A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs. - David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (AAAI, 2012)

A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations. - Jens Witkowski; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2012)

Predicting your own effort. - David F. Bacon; David C. Parkes; Yiling Chen 001; Malvika Rao; Ian A. Kash; Manu Sridharan (AAMAS, 2012)

Task routing for prediction tasks. - Haoqi Zhang; Eric Horvitz; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2012)

Human computation tasks with global constraints. - Haoqi Zhang; Edith Law; Rob Miller 001; Krzysztof Gajos; David C. Parkes; Eric Horvitz (CHI, 2012)

TurkServer: Enabling Synchronous and Longitudinal Online Experiments. - Andrew Mao; Yiling Chen 001; Krzysztof Z. Gajos; David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia; Haoqi Zhang (HCOMP@AAAI, 2012)

Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. - Victor Shnayder; Jeremy Hoon; David C. Parkes; Vikas Kawadia (INFOCOM Workshops, 2012)

Random Utility Theory for Social Choice. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (NIPS, 2012)

Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. - John K. Lai; David C. Parkes (EC, 2012)

Market user interface design. - Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes; Eric Horvitz; Kamal Jain; Mary Czerwinski; Desney S. Tan (EC, 2012)

Peer prediction without a common prior. - Jens Witkowski; David C. Parkes (EC, 2012)

Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences. - David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia (AAAI, 2013)

Automated Workflow Synthesis. - Haoqi Zhang; Eric Horvitz; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2013)

Dwelling on the Negative: Incentivizing Effort in Peer Prediction. - Jens Witkowski; Yoram Bachrach; Peter B. Key; David C. Parkes (HCOMP, 2013)

Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. - Valentin Robu; David C. Parkes; Takayuki Ito 001; Nicholas R. Jennings (IJCAI, 2013)

Generalized Method-of-Moments for Rank Aggregation. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; William Z. Chen; David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (NIPS, 2013)

Generalized Random Utility Models with Multiple Types. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; Hansheng Diao; Zhenyu Lai; David C. Parkes (NIPS, 2013)

Contrastive Learning Using Spectral Methods. - James Y. Zou; Daniel J. Hsu; David C. Parkes; Ryan Prescott Adams (NIPS, 2013)

Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (UAI, 2013)

Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games. - Yoram Bachrach; David C. Parkes; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein (Artif. Intell., 2013)

Capturing Cognitive Aspects of Human Judgment. - Andrew Mao; Hossein Azari Soufiani; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2013)

Truth, justice, and cake cutting. - Yiling Chen 001; John K. Lai; David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia (Games Econ. Behav., 2013)

An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging. - Valentin Robu; Enrico H. Gerding; Sebastian Stein 001; David C. Parkes; Alex Rogers; Nick R. Jennings (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2013)

SIGecom news. - David C. Parkes (SIGecom Exch., 2013)

Non-Cooperative Location Privacy. - Julien Freudiger; Mohammad Hossein Manshaei; Jean-Pierre Hubaux; David C. Parkes (IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput., 2013)

A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP game. - Shaili Jain; David C. Parkes (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013)

Sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive trust. - Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2014)

Approximating the shapley value via multi-issue decompositions. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; David Maxwell Chickering; Denis Xavier Charles; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2014)

Computing Parametric Ranking Models via Rank-Breaking. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (ICML, 2014)

Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing. - Victor Shnayder; David C. Parkes; Vikas Kawadia; Jeremy Hoon (MobiHoc, 2014)

A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice. - Hossein Azari Soufiani; David C. Parkes; Lirong Xia (NIPS, 2014)

Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Risk Averse Agents. - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2014)

Long-term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives. - Panos Toulis; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2014)

Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums. - Shaili Jain; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes (Games Econ. Behav., 2014)

Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions. - Ian A. Kash; Rohan Murty; David C. Parkes (IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput., 2014)

Special Issue on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems: Guest Editors' Introduction. - Costas Courcoubetis; Roch Guérin; Patrick Loiseau; David C. Parkes; Jean C. Walrand; Adam Wierman (ACM Trans. Internet Techn., 2014)

Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2015)

On Sex, Evolution, and the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm. - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2015)

Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. - James Y. Zou; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (CSCW, 2015)

Learnability of Influence in Networks. - Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes; Yaron Singer (NIPS, 2015)

Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design. - Panos Toulis; David C. Parkes; Elery Pfeffer; James Y. Zou (EC, 2015)

Statistical inference of long-term causal effects in multiagent systems under the Neyman-Rubin model. - Panos Toulis; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2015)

Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs. - Panos Toulis; David C. Parkes (Games Econ. Behav., 2015)

Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases. - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev., 2015)

Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers. - Paul Dütting; Felix A. Fischer; Pichayut Jirapinyo; John K. Lai; Benjamin Lubin; David C. Parkes (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015)

Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities. - David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia; Nisarg Shah 001 (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015)

Personalized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite Sybils. - Brandon K. Liu; David C. Parkes; Sven Seuken (AAMAS, 2016)

Practical Peer Prediction for Peer Assessment. - Victor Shnayder; David C. Parkes (HCOMP, 2016)

Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities. - Hongyao Ma; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2016)

Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response. - Hongyao Ma; Valentin Robu; Na Li; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2016)

Correlated Voting. - Debmalya Mandal; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2016)

When are Marginal Congestion Tolls Optimal? - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (ATT@IJCAI, 2016)

Automated Mechanism Design without Money via Machine Learning. - Harikrishna Narasimhan; Shivani Agarwal 001; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2016)

Measuring Performance of Peer Prediction Mechanisms Using Replicator Dynamics. - Victor Shnayder; Rafael M. Frongillo; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2016)

Long-term Causal Effects via Behavioral Game Theory. - Panagiotis Toulis; David C. Parkes (NIPS, 2016)

Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. - Paul Dütting; Felix A. Fischer; David C. Parkes (EC, 2016)

Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. - Victor Shnayder; Arpit Agarwal; Rafael M. Frongillo; David C. Parkes (EC, 2016)

A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms. - Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes (UAI, 2016)

Contingent Payment Mechanisms to Maximize Resource Utilization. - Hongyao Ma; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes; James Y. Zou (CoRR, 2016)

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Tasks. - Debmalya Mandal; Matthew Leifer; David C. Parkes; Galen Pickard; Victor Shnayder (CoRR, 2016)

Fair Division via Social Comparison. - Rediet Abebe; Jon M. Kleinberg; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2017)

Generalizing Demand Response Through Reward Bidding. - Hongyao Ma; David C. Parkes; Valentin Robu (AAMAS, 2017)

On AI, Markets and Machine Learning. - David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2017)

Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots - Extended Version. - David C. Parkes; Paul Tylkin; Lirong Xia (AAMAS Workshops (Visionary Papers), 2017)

Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. - David C. Parkes; Paul Tylkin; Lirong Xia (IJCAI, 2017)

Multi-View Decision Processes: The Helper-AI Problem. - Christos Dimitrakakis; David C. Parkes; Goran Radanovic; Paul Tylkin (NIPS, 2017)

Subjective fairness: Fairness is in the eye of the beholder. - Christos Dimitrakakis; Yang Liu 018; David C. Parkes; Goran Radanovic (CoRR, 2017)

Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. - Paul Dütting; Zhe Feng 004; Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2017)

Calibrated Fairness in Bandits. - Yang Liu 018; Goran Radanovic; Christos Dimitrakakis; Debmalya Mandal; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2017)

Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. - Ehud Kalai; Marco Battaglini; Gary Charness; Vincent P. Crawford; Françoise Forges; David C. Parkes; Jennifer Byrd (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets. - Zhe Feng 004; Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2018)

Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse Populations of Agents. - Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2018)

Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design. - Noah Golowich; Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2018)

Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. - Rediet Abebe; Jon M. Kleinberg; David C. Parkes; Charalampos E. Tsourakakis (KDD, 2018)

Optimizing Cluster-based Randomized Experiments under Monotonicity. - Jean Pouget-Abadie; Vahab S. Mirrokni; David C. Parkes; Edoardo M. Airoldi (KDD, 2018)

Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. - Hongyao Ma; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes (EC, 2018)

Technical perspective: Moving spectrum. - David C. Parkes (Commun. ACM, 2018)

Mechanism Design without Money for Common Goods. - Haris Aziz 001; Hau Chan; Barton E. Lee; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2018)

Bayesian Fairness. - Christos Dimitrakakis; Yang Liu 018; David C. Parkes; Goran Radanovic (AAAI, 2019)

How Do Fairness Definitions Fare?: Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. - Nripsuta Ani Saxena; Karen Huang; Evan DeFilippis; Goran Radanovic; David C. Parkes; Yang Liu 018 (AIES, 2019)

Contingent Payment Mechanisms for Resource Utilization. - Hongyao Ma; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes; James Y. Zou (AAMAS, 2019)

Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. - Goran Radanovic; Rati Devidze; David C. Parkes; Adish Singla (ICML, 2019)

Fairness without Harm: Decoupled Classifiers with Preference Guarantees. - Berk Ustun; Yang Liu 018; David C. Parkes (ICML, 2019)

Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. - Duncan Rheingans-Yoo; Scott Duke Kominers; Hongyao Ma; David C. Parkes (IJCAI, 2019)

Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games. - Jack Serrino; Max Kleiman-Weiner; David C. Parkes; Josh Tenenbaum 001 (NeurIPS, 2019)

Artificial Intelligence for Social Good. - Gregory D. Hager; Ann W. Drobnis; Fei Fang 001; Rayid Ghani; Amy Greenwald; Terah Lyons; David C. Parkes; Jason Schultz; Suchi Saria; Stephen F. Smith; Milind Tambe (CoRR, 2019)

Weighted Tensor Completion for Time-Series Causal Inference. - Debmalya Mandal; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2019)

Algorithmic and Economic Perspectives on Fairness. - David C. Parkes; Rakesh V. Vohra; et al. (CoRR, 2019)

Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol. - Michael Neuder; Daniel J. Moroz; Rithvik Rao; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2019)

Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions. - Paul Dütting; Felix A. Fischer; David C. Parkes (Math. Oper. Res., 2019)

Machine behaviour. - Iyad Rahwan; Manuel Cebrián; Nick Obradovich; Josh C. Bongard; Jean-François Bonnefon; Cynthia Breazeal; Jacob W. Crandall; Nicholas A. Christakis; Iain D. Couzin; Matthew O. Jackson; Nicholas R. Jennings; Ece Kamar; et al. (Nat., 2019)

Information Shaping for Enhanced Goal Recognition of Partially-Informed Agents. - Sarah Keren; Haifeng Xu; Kofi Kwapong; David C. Parkes; Barbara J. Grosz (AAAI, 2020)

The Effectiveness of Peer Prediction in Long-Term Forecasting. - Debmalya Mandal; Goran Radanovic; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2020)

Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. - Michael Neuder; Daniel J. Moroz; Rithvik Rao; David C. Parkes (AFT, 2020)

The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests. - Hau Chan; David C. Parkes; Karim R. Lakhani (AAMAS, 2020)

Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present-Bias. - Hongyao Ma; Reshef Meir; David C. Parkes; Elena Wu-Yan (AAMAS, 2020)

Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. - Sarah A. Wu; Rose E. Wang; James A. Evans; Josh Tenenbaum 001; David C. Parkes; Max Kleiman-Weiner (CogSci, 2020)

The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. - Zhe Feng 004; David C. Parkes; Haifeng Xu (ICML, 2020)

Reasoning About Plan Robustness Versus Plan Cost for Partially Informed Agents. - Sarah Keren; Sara Bernardini; Kofi Kwapong; David C. Parkes (KR, 2020)

From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization. - Nir Rosenfeld; Sophie Hilgard; Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; David C. Parkes (NeurIPS, 2020)

A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. - Nir Rosenfeld; Aron Szanto; David C. Parkes (WWW, 2020)

How do fairness definitions fare? Testing public attitudes towards three algorithmic definitions of fairness in loan allocations. - Nripsuta Ani Saxena; Karen Huang; Evan DeFilippis; Goran Radanovic; David C. Parkes; Yang Liu 018 (Artif. Intell., 2020)

Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems. - Daniel J. Moroz; Daniel J. Aronoff; Neha Narula; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2020)

The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies. - Stephan Zheng; Alexander Trott; Sunil Srinivasa; Nikhil Naik 002; Melvin Gruesbeck; David C. Parkes; Richard Socher (CoRR, 2020)

Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms. - Gianluca Brero; Alon Eden; Matthias Gerstgrasser; David C. Parkes; Duncan Rheingans-Yoo (CoRR, 2020)

Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. - Rediet Abebe; T.-H. Hubert Chan; Jon M. Kleinberg; Zhibin Liang; David C. Parkes; Mauro Sozio; Charalampos E. Tsourakakis (CoRR, 2020)

Artificial Intelligence & Cooperation. - Elisa Bertino; Finale Doshi-Velez; Maria L. Gini; Daniel Lopresti; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2020)

The Rise of AI-Driven Simulators: Building a New Crystal Ball. - Ian T. Foster; David C. Parkes; Stephan Zheng (CoRR, 2020)

Modernizing Data Control: Making Personal Digital Data Mutually Beneficial for Citizens and Industry. - Sujata Banerjee; Yiling Chen 001; Kobbi Nissim; David C. Parkes; Katie A. Siek; Lauren Wilcox (CoRR, 2020)

The capacity constrained facility location problem. - Haris Aziz 001; Hau Chan; Barton E. Lee; David C. Parkes (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. - Arpit Agarwal; Debmalya Mandal; David C. Parkes; Nisarg Shah 001 (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020)

Incentivizing Deep Fixes in Software Economies. - Malvika Rao; David F. Bacon; David C. Parkes; Margo I. Seltzer (IEEE Trans. Software Eng., 2020)

Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms. - Gianluca Brero; Alon Eden; Matthias Gerstgrasser; David C. Parkes; Duncan Rheingans-Yoo (AAAI, 2021)

Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. - Matheus V. X. Ferreira; Daniel J. Moroz; David C. Parkes; Mitchell Stern (AFT, 2021)

Learning Robust Helpful Behaviors in Two-Player Cooperative Atari Environments. - Paul Tylkin; Goran Radanovic; David C. Parkes (AAMAS, 2021)

Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. - Sophie Hilgard; Nir Rosenfeld; Mahzarin R. Banaji; Jack Cao; David C. Parkes (ICML, 2021)

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market (Invited Talk). - Matheus V. X. Ferreira; Daniel J. Moroz; David C. Parkes; Mitchell Stern (Tokenomics, 2021)

Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. - Vincent Conitzer; Zhe Feng 004; David C. Parkes; Eric Sodomka (WINE, 2021)

Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. - Mark York; Munther A. Dahleh; David C. Parkes (WINE, 2021)

Optimal auctions through deep learning. - Paul Dütting; Zhe Feng 004; Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes; Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath (Commun. ACM, 2021)

Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders. - Michael Neuder; Daniel J. Moroz; Rithvik Rao; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2021)

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3. - Michael Neuder; Rithvik Rao; Daniel J. Moroz; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2021)

Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching. - Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; Zhe Feng 004; Shira Li; Jonathan Ma; Scott Duke Kominers; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2021)

The AI Economist: Optimal Economic Policy Design via Two-level Deep Reinforcement Learning. - Stephan Zheng; Alexander Trott; Sunil Srinivasa; David C. Parkes; Richard Socher (CoRR, 2021)

Playing with symmetry with neural networks. - David C. Parkes (Nat. Mach. Intell., 2021)

Too Many Cooks: Bayesian Inference for Coordinating Multi-Agent Collaboration. - Sarah A. Wu; Rose E. Wang; James A. Evans; Joshua B. Tenenbaum; David C. Parkes; Max Kleiman-Weiner (Top. Cogn. Sci., 2021)

Too Many cooks: Bayesian inference for coordinating Multi-agent Collaboration. - Rose E. Wang; Sarah A. Wu; James A. Evans; David C. Parkes; Joshua B. Tenenbaum; Max Kleiman-Weiner (Human-Like Machine Intelligence, 2022)

Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract). - Mira Finkelstein; Lucy Liu; Yoav Kolumbus; David C. Parkes; Jeffrey S. Rosenshein; Sarah Keren (AAAI, 2022)

Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design✱. - Zhou Fan; Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío; Ben Altschuler; He Sun; Xintong Wang 002; David C. Parkes (ICAIF, 2022)

CrowdPlay: Crowdsourcing Human Demonstrations for Offline Learning. - Matthias Gerstgrasser; Rakshit Trivedi; David C. Parkes (ICLR, 2022)

Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms. - Gianluca Brero; Eric Mibuari; Nicolas Lepore; David C. Parkes (NeurIPS, 2022)

Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms. - Mira Finkelstein; Nitsan Levy Schlot; Lucy Liu; Yoav Kolumbus; David C. Parkes; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein; Sarah Keren (NeurIPS, 2022)

Using Reinforcement Learning to Study Platform Economies under Market Shocks. - Xintong Wang 002; Gary Qiurui Ma; Alon Eden; Clara Li; Alexander Trott; Stephan Zheng; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2022)

Learning Stackelberg Equilibria and Applications to Economic Design Games. - Gianluca Brero; Alon Eden; Darshan Chakrabarti; Matthias Gerstgrasser; Vincent Li; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2022)

Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence. - Peter Stone 001; Rodney Brooks; Erik Brynjolfsson; Ryan Calo; Oren Etzioni; Greg Hager; Julia Hirschberg; Shivaram Kalyanakrishnan; Ece Kamar; Sarit Kraus; Kevin Leyton-Brown; David C. Parkes; et al. (CoRR, 2022)

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. - Hongyao Ma; Fei Fang 001; David C. Parkes (Oper. Res., 2022)

Opinion Dynamics Optimization by Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. - Rediet Abebe; T.-H. Hubert Chan; Jon M. Kleinberg; Zhibin Liang; David C. Parkes; Mauro Sozio; Charalampos E. Tsourakakis (ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data, 2022)

Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. - Jamelle Watson-Daniels; David C. Parkes; Berk Ustun (AAAI, 2023)

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3. - Zhou Fan; Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío; Daniel J. Moroz; Michael Neuder; Rithvik Rao; David C. Parkes (AFT, 2023)

Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. - Zhun Deng; He Sun; Steven Wu 001; Linjun Zhang; David C. Parkes (AISTATS, 2023)

Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data. - He Sun; Zhun Deng; Hui Chen; David C. Parkes (ICAIF, 2023)

Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. - Matthias Gerstgrasser; David C. Parkes (ICML, 2023)

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks. - Tonghan Wang 001; Paul Duetting; Dmitry Ivanov; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; David C. Parkes (NeurIPS, 2023)

Data Market Design through Deep Learning. - Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; Yanchen Jiang; David C. Parkes (NeurIPS, 2023)

Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. - Yaniv Yacoby; John Girash; David C. Parkes (SIGCSE (1), 2023)

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. - Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira; David C. Parkes (STOC, 2023)

Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study. - Xintong Wang 002; Gary Qiurui Ma; Alon Eden; Clara Li; Alexander Trott; Stephan Zheng; David C. Parkes (WWW, 2023)

Eliciting Information from participants with Competing Incentives and Dependent Beliefs. - Manuel Wuthrich; Mark York; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2023)

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks. - Tonghan Wang 001; Paul Dütting; Dmitry Ivanov; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2023)

Chain-of-Thought Reasoning is a Policy Improvement Operator. - Hugh Zhang; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2023)

Platform Equilibrium: Analayzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. - Alon Eden; Gary Qiurui Ma; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2023)

Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract). - Luca D'Amico-Wong; Gary Qiurui Ma; David C. Parkes (AAAI, 2024)

Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. - Denizalp Goktas; David C. Parkes; Ian Gemp; Luke Marris; Georgios Piliouras; Romuald Elie; Guy Lever; Andrea Tacchetti (ICLR, 2024)

Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. - Omer Nahum; Gali Noti; David C. Parkes; Nir Rosenfeld (ICLR, 2024)

Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective. - Safwan Hossain; Tonghan Wang 001; Tao Lin 013; Yiling Chen 001; David C. Parkes; Haifeng Xu (ICML, 2024)

Position: Social Environment Design Should be Further Developed for AI-based Policy-Making. - Edwin Zhang; Sadie Zhao; Tonghan Wang 001; Safwan Hossain; Henry Gasztowtt; Stephan Zheng; David C. Parkes; Milind Tambe; Yiling Chen 001 (ICML, 2024)

GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. - Tonghan Wang 001; Yanchen Jiang; David C. Parkes (EC, 2024)

Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. - Luca D'Amico-Wong; Yannai A. Gonczarowski; Gary Qiurui Ma; David C. Parkes (EC, 2024)

Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. - Alon Eden; Gary Qiurui Ma; David C. Parkes (EC, 2024)

Generative Social Choice. - Sara Fish; Paul Gölz; David C. Parkes; Ariel D. Procaccia; Gili Rusak; Itai Shapira; Manuel Wüthrich (EC, 2024)

Predictive Churn with the Set of Good Models. - Jamelle Watson-Daniels; Flávio du Pin Calmon; Alexander D'Amour; Carol Xuan Long; David C. Parkes; Berk Ustun (CoRR, 2024)

Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality. - Michael J. Curry; Zhou Fan; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2024)

Easy as ABCs: Unifying Boltzmann Q-Learning and Counterfactual Regret Minimization. - Luca D'Amico-Wong; Hugh Zhang; Marc Lanctot; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2024)

Social Environment Design. - Edwin Zhang; Sadie Zhao; Tonghan Wang 001; Safwan Hossain; Henry Gasztowtt; Stephan Zheng; David C. Parkes; Milind Tambe; Yiling Chen 001 (CoRR, 2024)

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions. - Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; Zhe Feng 004; Di Wang 005; Manzil Zaheer; Aranyak Mehta; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2024)

Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning. - Dima Ivanov; Paul Dütting; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Tonghan Wang 001; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2024)

Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. - Paul Dütting; Zhe Feng 004; Harikrishna Narasimhan; David C. Parkes; Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath (J. ACM, 2024)

Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification. - Paul Dütting; Felix A. Fischer; David C. Parkes (Math. Oper. Res., 2024)

On Diffusion Models for Multi-Agent Partial Observability: Shared Attractors, Error Bounds, and Composite Flow. - Tonghan Wang 001; Heng Dong 001; Yanchen Jiang; David C. Parkes; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2025)

Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxies. - David Huang; Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío; Edwin Lock; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2025)

LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment. - Ermis Soumalias; Yanchen Jiang; Kehang Zhu; Michael J. Curry; Sven Seuken; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2025)

Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI. - Lewis Hammond; Alan Chan; Jesse Clifton; Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier; Akbir Khan; Euan McLean; Chandler Smith; Wolfram Barfuss; Jakob N. Foerster; Tomas Gavenciak; The Anh Han; Edward Hughes 001; et al. (CoRR, 2025)

BundleFlow: Deep Menus for Combinatorial Auctions by Diffusion-Based Optimization. - Tonghan Wang 001; Yanchen Jiang; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2025)

Learning from Synthetic Labs: Language Models as Auction Participants. - Anand Shah; Kehang Zhu; Yanchen Jiang; Jeffrey G. Wang; Arif Kerem Dayi; John J. Horton; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2025)

Pricing with Tips in Three-Sided Delivery Platforms. - Yannai A. Gonczarowski; Gary Qiurui Ma; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2025)