Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good. - Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa (J. Econ. Theory, 2000)

Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes. - Dolors Berga (Soc. Choice Welf., 2002)

Stability and voting by committees with exit. - Dolors Berga; Gustavo Bergantiños; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme (Soc. Choice Welf., 2004)

On Exiting After Voting. - Dolors Berga; Gustavo Bergantiños; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme (Int. J. Game Theory, 2006)

An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. - Dolors Berga; Gustavo Bergantiños; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme (Math. Soc. Sci., 2007)

Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences. - Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Soc. Choice Welf., 2009)

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (J. Econ. Theory, 2010)

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Games Econ. Behav., 2012)

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Int. J. Game Theory, 2012)

Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Soc. Choice Welf., 2012)

Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (MDAI, 2013)

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model. - Kentaro Hatsumi; Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa (Int. J. Game Theory, 2014)

Immunity to credible deviations from the truth. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Math. Soc. Sci., 2017)

Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Soc. Choice Welf., 2020)

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain. - Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno; Antonio Nicolò (Soc. Choice Welf., 2023)