Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. - Elchanan Ben-Porath; Michael Kahneman (Games Econ. Behav., 2003)

Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. - Elchanan Ben-Porath (J. Econ. Theory, 2003)

Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information. - Elchanan Ben-Porath; Aviad Heifetz (J. Econ. Theory, 2011)

Implementation with partial provability. - Elchanan Ben-Porath; Barton L. Lipman (J. Econ. Theory, 2012)

Game Theory, Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir. Cambridge University Press (2013). - Elchanan Ben-Porath (Games Econ. Behav., 2014)