Using Textual Entailment with Variables for KBP Slot Filling Task. - Ofer Bronstein; Erel Segal-haLevi (TAC, 2012)

PLIS: a Probabilistic Lexical Inference System. - Eyal Shnarch; Erel Segal-haLevi; Jacob Goldberger; Ido Dagan (ACL (Conference System Demonstrations), 2013)

NegoChat: a chat-based negotiation agent. - Avi Rosenfeld; Inon Zuckerman; Erel Segal-Halevi; Osnat Drein; Sarit Kraus (AAMAS, 2014)

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (AAAI, 2015)

Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (AAMAS, 2015)

Fair Cake-Cutting among Groups. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shmuel Nitzan (CoRR, 2015)

Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shmuel Nitzan; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (CoRR, 2015)

Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting. - Balázs R. Sziklai; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2015)

First Steps in Chat-Based Negotiating Agents. - Inon Zuckerman; Erel Segal-Halevi; Avi Rosenfeld; Sarit Kraus (Next Frontier in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation, 2015)

SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (SAGT, 2016)

NegoChat-A: a chat-based negotiation agent with bounded rationality. - Avi Rosenfeld; Inon Zuckerman; Erel Segal-Halevi; Osnat Drein; Sarit Kraus (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2016)

How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2016)

Cutting a Cake without Harming the Toppings. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2016)

A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (CoRR, 2016)

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shmuel Nitzan; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (CoRR, 2016)

Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (Oper. Res. Lett., 2016)

Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2016)

Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Haris Aziz 001; Avinatan Hassidim (IJCAI, 2017)

On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice. - Mor Nitzan; Shmuel Nitzan; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2017)

Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2017)

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2017)

On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (CoRR, 2017)

Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim (CoRR, 2017)

How to Charge Lightning. - Simina Brânzei; Erel Segal-Halevi; Aviv Zohar (CoRR, 2017)

MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (AAAI, 2018)

Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information. - Shani Alkoby; David Sarne; Erel Segal-Halevi; Tomer Sharbaf (AAMAS, 2018)

Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes. - Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2018)

Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven. - Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2018)

Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (IJCAI, 2018)

Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed? - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2018)

Making an Appraiser Work for You. - Shani Alkobi; David Sarne; Erel Segal-Halevi; Tomer Sharbaf (CoRR, 2018)

Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Balázs R. Sziklai (Math. Soc. Sci., 2018)

Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms. - Mor Nitzan; Shmuel Nitzan; Erel Segal-Halevi (Soc. Choice Welf., 2018)

Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements. - Arseniy V. Akopyan; Erel Segal-Halevi (SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2018)

Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shani Alkoby; Tomer Sharbaf; David Sarne (AAMAS, 2019)

Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Artif. Intell., 2019)

Bipartite Envy-Free Matching. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation. - Haris Aziz 001; Xin Huang; Nicholas Mattei; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. - Fedor Sandomirskiy; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

The Maximin Share Dominance Relation. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

Quasilinear Rental Harmony. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2019)

Fair cake-cutting among families. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shmuel Nitzan (Soc. Choice Welf., 2019)

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. - Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAAI, 2020)

Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness. - Erel Segal-Halevi (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020)

Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shani Alkoby; David Sarne (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020)

Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods. - Haris Aziz 001; Xin Huang; Nicholas Mattei; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2020)

Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Haris Aziz 001 (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2020)

Envy-Free Division of Land. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Shmuel Nitzan; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann (Math. Oper. Res., 2020)

A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. - Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2021)

Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. - Edith Elkind; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (IJCAI, 2021)

Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. - Itay Shtechman; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2021)

Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. - Dvir Gilor; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Artif. Intell., 2021)

On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms. - Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2021)

Fair multi-cake cutting. - Erel Segal-Halevi (Discret. Appl. Math., 2021)

How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Am. Math. Mon., 2021)

How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels. - Simina Brânzei; Erel Segal-Halevi; Aviv Zohar (Allerton, 2022)

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. - Hadi Hosseini; Andrew Searns; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2022)

Redividing the cake. - Erel Segal-Halevi (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022)

Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation. - Edith Elkind; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Artif. Intell., 2022)

Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets. - Samuel Bismuth; Vladislav Makarov; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2022)

Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution. - Dinesh Kumar Baghel; Vadim E. Levit; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2022)

Fair cake-cutting in practice. - Maria Kyropoulou; Josué Ortega; Erel Segal-Halevi (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. - Fedor Sandomirskiy; Erel Segal-Halevi (Oper. Res., 2022)

Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division. - Elad Aigner-Horev; Erel Segal-Halevi (Inf. Sci., 2022)

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. - Hadi Hosseini; Andrew Searns; Erel Segal-Halevi (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2022)

One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? - Roy Baharad; Shmuel Nitzan; Erel Segal-Halevi (Soc. Choice Welf., 2022)

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting. - Josué Ortega; Erel Segal-Halevi (Soc. Choice Welf., 2022)

Generalized Rental Harmony. - Erel Segal-Halevi (Am. Math. Mon., 2022)

Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems. - Ron Aharoni; Eli Berger; Joseph Briggs; Erel Segal-Halevi; Shira Zerbib (Comb., 2022)

Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. - Hila Shoshan; Noam Hazon; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2023)

Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. - Eden Hartman; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann; Erel Segal-Halevi (ECAI, 2023)

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract). - Hadi Hosseini; Andrew Searns; Erel Segal-Halevi (IJCAI, 2023)

Balanced Donor Coordination. - Felix Brandt 001; Matthias Greger; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (EC, 2023)

A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. - Xin Huang; Erel Segal-Halevi (EC, 2023)

Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads. - Israel Jacobovich; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2023)

Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. - Chester Lawrence; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2023)

k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution. - Dinesh Kumar Baghel; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2023)

On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. - Zsuzsanna Jankó; Attila Joó; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2023)

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. - Amitay Dror; Michal Feldman; Erel Segal-Halevi (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023)

Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. - Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Am. Math. Mon., 2023)

Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods. - Haris Aziz 001; Xin Huang; Nicholas Mattei; Erel Segal-Halevi (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2023)

Keep your distance: Land division with separation. - Edith Elkind; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Comput. Geom., 2023)

On maximum bipartite matching with separation. - Pasin Manurangsi; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (Inf. Process. Lett., 2023)

Fairness for multi-self agents. - Sophie Bade; Erel Segal-Halevi (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)

Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. - Dvir Gilor; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Artif. Intell., 2023)

On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. - Zsuzsanna Jankó; Attila Joó; Erel Segal-Halevi; Sheung Man Yuen (ECAI, 2024)

Partitioning Problems with Splittings and Interval Targets. - Samuel Bismuth; Vladislav Makarov; Erel Segal-Halevi; Dana Shapira (ISAAC, 2024)

k-Times Bin Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution. - Dinesh Kumar Baghel; Alex Ravsky; Erel Segal-Halevi (SAGT, 2024)

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-degenerate Valuations. - Samuel Bismuth; Ivan Bliznets; Erel Segal-Halevi (SAGT, 2024)

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. - Felix Brandt 001; Matthias Greger; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (EC, 2024)

Weighted Envy Freeness With Limited Subsidies. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2024)

Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. - Mithun Chakraborty; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2024)

Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing. - Jugal Garg; Xin Huang; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAAI, 2025)

Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization. - Eden Hartman; Yonatan Aumann; Avinatan Hassidim; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAAI, 2025)

Weighted Envy Freeness With Bounded Subsidies. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2025)

It's Not All Black and White: Degree of Truthfulness for Risk-Avoiding Agents. - Eden Hartman; Erel Segal-Halevi; Biaoshuai Tao (EC, 2025)

Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. - Alexandros Hollender; Chester Lawrence; Erel Segal-Halevi (J. Complex., 2025)

Dividing a Graphical Cake. - Xiaohui Bei; Edith Elkind; Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong (SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2025)

Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Haris Aziz 001; Rica Gonen; Xin Huang; Kei Kimura; Indrajit Saha; Erel Segal-Halevi; Zhaohong Sun 001; Mashbat Suzuki; Makoto Yokoo (CoRR, 2025)

Fair division of the replacement-units without an appraiser in urban renewal processes. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)

Fairly Wired: Towards Leximin-Optimal Division of Electricity. - Eden Hartman; Dinesh Kumar Baghel; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)

Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective? - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)

The Min Max Average Cycle Weight Problem. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)