The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem. - Felipe Balmaceda; Santiago R. Balseiro; José R. Correa; Nicolás E. Stier Moses (WINE, 2010)

Optimal task assignments. - Felipe Balmaceda (Games Econ. Behav., 2016)

Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability. - Felipe Balmaceda; Santiago R. Balseiro; José R. Correa; Nicolás E. Stier Moses (Games Econ. Behav., 2016)

Trust in cohesive communities. - Felipe Balmaceda; Juan F. Escobar (J. Econ. Theory, 2017)

Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? - Felipe Balmaceda (Int. J. Game Theory, 2020)

Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns. - Felipe Balmaceda (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)