Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. - Françoise Forges (Math. Oper. Res., 1988)

Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission. - Françoise Forges (Essays in Game Theory, 1994)

A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core. - Françoise Forges; Enrico Minelli (J. Econ. Theory, 2001)

The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game. - Françoise Forges (Math. Soc. Sci., 2004)

Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments. - Françoise Forges (Soc. Choice Welf., 2006)

Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types. - Frédéric Koessler; Françoise Forges (IGTR, 2008)

Long persuasion games. - Françoise Forges; Frédéric Koessler (J. Econ. Theory, 2008)

Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity. - Bernhard von Stengel; Françoise Forges (Math. Oper. Res., 2008)

Afriat's theorem for general budget sets. - Françoise Forges; Enrico Minelli (J. Econ. Theory, 2009)

Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games. - Françoise Forges (Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009)

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values. - Omer Biran; Françoise Forges (Games Econ. Behav., 2011)

A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment. - Françoise Forges (Games Econ. Behav., 2013)

Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open Problems. - Françoise Forges; Roberto Serrano (IGTR, 2013)

Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406]. - Françoise Forges; Enrico Minelli (J. Econ. Theory, 2014)

Bayesian repeated games and reputation. - Antoine Salomon; Françoise Forges (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games. - Françoise Forges; Ulrich Horst; Antoine Salomon (Int. J. Game Theory, 2016)

Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. - Ehud Kalai; Marco Battaglini; Gary Charness; Vincent P. Crawford; Françoise Forges; David C. Parkes; Jennifer Byrd (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval. - Françoise Forges; Jérôme Renault (Int. J. Game Theory, 2021)

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. - Stéphan Sémirat; Françoise Forges (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm. - Françoise Forges; József Sákovics (Int. J. Game Theory, 2022)