Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication. - Frédéric Koessler (Math. Soc. Sci., 2001)

Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty. - Frédéric Koessler (J. Econ. Theory, 2003)

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. - Frédéric Koessler (Games Econ. Behav., 2004)

Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations. - Philippe Jehiel; Frédéric Koessler (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types. - Frédéric Koessler; Françoise Forges (IGTR, 2008)

Long persuasion games. - Françoise Forges; Frédéric Koessler (J. Econ. Theory, 2008)

Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification. - Frédéric Koessler (Math. Soc. Sci., 2008)

Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. - Frédéric Koessler; David Martimort (J. Econ. Theory, 2012)

Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. - Nicolas Jacquemet; Frédéric Koessler (Games Econ. Behav., 2013)

Informed seller with taste heterogeneity. - Frédéric Koessler; Vasiliki Skreta (J. Econ. Theory, 2016)

Evidence reading mechanisms. - Frédéric Koessler; Eduardo Perez-Richet (Soc. Choice Welf., 2019)

Cheap talk with coarse understanding. - Jeanne Hagenbach; Frédéric Koessler (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Information Design in Large Games. - Frédéric Koessler; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2021)

Interactive Information Design. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2022)

A belief-based approach to signaling. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala (EC, 2024)

Splitting games over finite sets. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Math. Program., 2024)

Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players. - Frédéric Koessler; Marieke Pahlke (J. Econ. Theory, 2025)