Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies. - Harold L. Cole; George J. Mailath; Andrew Postlewaite (J. Econ. Theory, 2001)

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. - George J. Mailath; Ichiro Obara; Tadashi Sekiguchi (Games Econ. Behav., 2002)

Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring. - George J. Mailath; Stephen Morris (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria. - George J. Mailath; Andrew Postlewaite; Larry Samuelson (Games Econ. Behav., 2005)

Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships. - Martin W. Cripps; George J. Mailath; Larry Samuelson (J. Econ. Theory, 2007)

Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? - George J. Mailath; Georg Nöldeke (J. Econ. Theory, 2008)

Reputation Effects. - George J. Mailath (Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009)

Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring. - George J. Mailath; Wojciech Olszewski (Games Econ. Behav., 2011)

Common learning with intertemporal dependence. - Martin W. Cripps; Jeffrey C. Ely; George J. Mailath; Larry Samuelson (Int. J. Game Theory, 2013)

Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications. - George J. Mailath; Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (J. Econ. Theory, 2013)