Arrow's Theorem, Weglorz' Models and the Axiom of Choice. - Norbert Brunner; H. Reiju Mihara (Math. Log. Q., 2000)

Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives. - H. Reiju Mihara (Soc. Choice Welf., 2000)

Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof. - H. Reiju Mihara (Soc. Choice Welf., 2001)

Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games. - H. Reiju Mihara (Math. Soc. Sci., 2004)

Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core - Masahiro Kumabe; H. Reiju Mihara (CoRR, 2007)

The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games. - Masahiro Kumabe; H. Reiju Mihara (Soc. Choice Welf., 2008)

Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities - Masahiro Kumabe; H. Reiju Mihara (CoRR, 2011)

The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma - H. Reiju Mihara (CoRR, 2011)

Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction. - Masahiro Kumabe; H. Reiju Mihara (Games Econ. Behav., 2011)