A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium. - Uriel Feige; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SAGT, 2010)

A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium - Uriel Feige; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2010)

Human computation and crowdsourcing. - Michael S. Bernstein; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2010)

Ad auctions with data. - Hu Fu 001; Patrick R. Jordan; Mohammad Mahdian; Uri Nadav; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Sergei Vassilvitskii (INFOCOM Workshops, 2012)

Supply-limiting mechanisms. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Qiqi Yan (EC, 2012)

XRDS reloaded. - Peter Kinnaird; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2012)

Announcing the XRDS blog. - Peter Kinnaird; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2012)

Are you a good match for XRDS?. - Peter Kinnaird; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2012)

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2013)

Refine Predictions Ad Infinitum? - Mukund Sundararajan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2013)

'Information wants to be free'. - Peter Kinnaird; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2013)

Equip Yourself for Creativity. - Peter Kinnaird; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2013)

Money and power in academic publishing. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Peter Kinnaird (XRDS, 2013)

Towards a critical debate about technology and its impact. - Sean Follmer; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2014)

A shrimp's tale: why we need to fund research. - Sean Follmer; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2014)

Enriching your network via diversity. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2014)

Do no evil in research. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Sean Follmer (XRDS, 2014)

Vertex Sparsifiers: New Results from Old Techniques. - Matthias Englert; Anupam Gupta 001; Robert Krauthgamer; Harald Räcke; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Kunal Talwar (SIAM J. Comput., 2014)

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. - Shahar Dobzinski; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Omri Weinstein (WINE, 2015)

Crossing boundaries. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen (XRDS, 2015)

Why prices need algorithms. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SIGecom Exch., 2015)

Robust market design: information and computation. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen (2015)

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. - Uriel Feige; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (APPROX-RANDOM, 2016)

Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. - Mukund Sundararajan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Theory Comput. Syst., 2016)

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016)

When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Jan Vondrák (APPROX-RANDOM, 2017)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. - Alon Eden; Michal Feldman; Ophir Friedler; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (EC, 2017)

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. - Alon Eden; Michal Feldman; Ophir Friedler; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (EC, 2017)

Why prices need algorithms (invited talk). - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (STOC, 2017)

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets. - Moshe Babaioff; Noam Nisan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2017)

Modularity and greed in double auctions. - Paul Dütting; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Tim Roughgarden (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. - Tomer Ezra; Michal Feldman; Eric Neyman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (CoRR, 2018)

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2018)

Simple versus Optimal Contracts. - Paul Dütting; Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2019)

Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes. - Moshe Babaioff; Noam Nisan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (FAT, 2019)

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. - Tomer Ezra; Michal Feldman; Eric Neyman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (FOCS, 2019)

Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive. - Moshe Babaioff; Noam Nisan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2019)

Prior-Independent Auctions. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms, 2020)

Multiagent Evaluation Mechanisms. - Tal Alon; Magdalen Dobson; Ariel D. Procaccia; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Jamie Tucker-Foltz (AAAI, 2020)

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. - Moshe Babaioff; Michal Feldman; Yannai A. Gonczarowski; Brendan Lucier; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2020)

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. - Alon Eden; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Ori Zviran (CoRR, 2020)

Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition. - Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Qiqi Yan (Oper. Res., 2020)

Approximate Modularity Revisited. - Uriel Feige; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SIAM J. Comput., 2020)

Editors' introduction. - Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (SIGecom Exch., 2020)

Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Konstantin Zabarnyi (AAAI, 2021)

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. - Alon Eden; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Ori Zviran (AAAI, 2021)

Strategic Classification in the Dark. - Ganesh Ghalme; Vineet Nair; Itay Eilat; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Nir Rosenfeld (ICML, 2021)

Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation. - Ameer Amer; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SAGT, 2021)

Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort. - Tal Alon; Paul Dütting; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2021)

Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. - Tal Alon; Ron Lavi; Elisheva S. Shamash; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2021)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. - Alon Eden; Michal Feldman; Ophir Friedler; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; S. Matthew Weinberg (Oper. Res., 2021)

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets. - Moshe Babaioff; Noam Nisan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Math. Oper. Res., 2021)

The Complexity of Contracts. - Paul Dütting; Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SIAM J. Comput., 2021)

Strategic Representation. - Vineet Nair; Ganesh Ghalme; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Nir Rosenfeld (ICML, 2022)

Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (ITCS, 2022)

Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions. - Nir Bachrach; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2022)

Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks. - Tonghan Wang 001; Paul Duetting; Dmitry Ivanov; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; David C. Parkes (NeurIPS, 2023)

Delegated Classification. - Eden Saig; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Nir Rosenfeld (NeurIPS, 2023)

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts. - Tal Alon; Paul Duetting; Yingkai Li; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2023)

Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2023)

Interdependent Public Projects. - Avi Cohen; Michal Feldman; Divyarthi Mohan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (SODA, 2023)

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks. - Tonghan Wang 001; Paul Dütting; Dmitry Ivanov; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2023)

Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. - Yotam Gafni; Xin Huang; Ron Lavi; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2023)

MAC Advice for facility location mechanism design. - Zohar Barak; Anupam Gupta 001; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (NeurIPS, 2024)

Contracting with a Learning Agent. - Guru Guruganesh; Yoav Kolumbus; Jon Schneider; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis; Joshua R. Wang; S. Matthew Weinberg (NeurIPS, 2024)

Incentivizing Quality Text Generation via Statistical Contracts. - Eden Saig; Ohad Einav; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (NeurIPS, 2024)

Algorithmic Cheap Talk. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2024)

Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2024)

Strategy-Proof Auctions through Conformal Prediction. - Roy Maor Lotan; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Yaniv Romano (CoRR, 2024)

Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning. - Dima Ivanov; Paul Dütting; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Tonghan Wang 001; David C. Parkes (CoRR, 2024)

Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey. - Paul Dütting; Michal Feldman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., 2024)

Technical Note - Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. - Tal Alon; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Ron Lavi; Elisheva S. Shamash (Oper. Res., 2024)

Welfare and Beyond in Multi-Agent Contracts. - Gil Aharoni; Martin Hoefer 001; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2025)

Multi-Project Contracts. - Tal Alon; Matteo Castiglioni; Junjie Chen; Tomer Ezra; Yingkai Li; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2025)

Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality. - Batya Berzack; Rotem Oshman; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (EC, 2025)

An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries. - Ilan Doron-Arad; Hadas Shachnai; Gilad Shmerler; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (CoRR, 2025)