Infinite sequential games with perfect but incomplete information. - Itai Arieli; Yehuda Levy (Int. J. Game Theory, 2011)

Average testing and Pareto efficiency. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2012)

Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (CoRR, 2015)

Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games. - Itai Arieli (Dyn. Games Appl., 2015)

Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. - Itai Arieli; Yehuda John Levy (Games Econ. Behav., 2015)

The logic of backward induction. - Itai Arieli; Robert J. Aumann (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Random extensive form games. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2016)

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (EC, 2017)

Forecast Aggregation. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2017)

The Crowdfunding Game. - Itai Arieli; Moran Koren; Rann Smorodinsky (WINE, 2017)

Payoff externalities and social learning. - Itai Arieli (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Sequential commitment games. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Moshe Tennenholtz (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Inferring beliefs from actions. - Itai Arieli; Manuel Mueller-Frank (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. - Itai Arieli; Moran Koren; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2018)

Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (EC, 2019)

Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Segev Shlomov (EC, 2019)

The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Moran Koren; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2019)

Private Bayesian persuasion. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2019)

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz (EC, 2020)

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky; Takuro Yamashita (EC, 2020)

Identifiable information structures. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Multi-issue social learning. - Gal Bahar; Itai Arieli; Rann Smorodinsky; Moshe Tennenholtz (Math. Soc. Sci., 2020)

Sequential Naive Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (EC, 2021)

On Social Networks that Support Learning. - Itai Arieli; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2021)

Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. - Gideon Amir; Itai Arieli; Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Ron Peretz (CoRR, 2021)

Virtually additive learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Segev Shlomov (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)

A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Manuel Mueller-Frank (Math. Oper. Res., 2021)

Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz (SIGecom Exch., 2021)

Persuasion as Transportation. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (EC, 2022)

Herd Design. - Itai Arieli; Ronen Gradwohl; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2022)

Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (CoRR, 2022)

Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs). - Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2022)

Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (Oper. Res., 2022)

Mediated Cheap Talk Design. - Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz (AAAI, 2023)

The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Stephan Müller; Farzad Pourbabaee; Omer Tamuz (EC, 2023)

Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2023)

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. - Ronen Gradwohl; Itai Arieli; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2023)

Resilient Information Aggregation. - Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz (TARK, 2023)

The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk. - Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2023)

Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design. - Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2024)

Robust Price Discrimination. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Omer Madmon; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2024)

Persuading while Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Dimitry Shaiderman; Xianwen Shi (CoRR, 2024)

Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information. - Itai Arieli; Srinivas Arigapudi (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

Reputation-based persuasion platforms. - Itai Arieli; Omer Madmon; Moshe Tennenholtz (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

A population's feasible posterior beliefs. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)

Anonymous Network Formation. - Itai Arieli; Leonie Baumann; Wade Hann-Caruthers (EC, 2025)

Constructive Blackwell's Theorem. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (EC, 2025)

Granular DeGroot dynamics - A model for robust naive learning in social networks. - Gideon Amir; Itai Arieli; Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Ron Peretz (J. Econ. Theory, 2025)

Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds. - Itai Arieli; Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Ron Peretz; Yevgeny Tsodikovich (J. Econ. Theory, 2025)