Super Arrovian Domains with Strict Preferences. - Peter C. Fishburn; Jerry S. Kelly (SIAM J. Discret. Math., 1997)

Information and preference aggregation. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2000)

Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2002)

On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2003)

Correction to: 'Information and preference aggregation'. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2005)

Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2006)

Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2007)

Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2007)

Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, 2009)

Strategy-proofness and weighted voting. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2010)

There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think. - Donald E. Campbell; Jack E. Graver; Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2012)

Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2013)

Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Soc. Choice Welf., 2014)

Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives. - Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2015)

A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule. - Jerry S. Kelly; Shaofang Qi (Soc. Choice Welf., 2016)

Balancedness of social choice correspondences. - Jerry S. Kelly; Shaofang Qi (Math. Soc. Sci., 2019)

Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence. - Jerry S. Kelly (Math. Soc. Sci., 2020)