A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (STOC, 2009)

Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players. - Jing Chen 017; Avinatan Hassidim; Silvio Micali (ICS, 2010)

Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali; Paul Valiant (ICS, 2010)

Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - (Abstract). - Pablo Daniel Azar; Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (AMMA, 2011)

Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (FOCS, 2011)

Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions. - Pablo Azar 002; Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (ITCS, 2012)

Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (J. Econ. Theory, 2012)

Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs. - Jing Chen 017 (2012)

Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets. - Hau Chan; Jing Chen 017 (WINE, 2014)

Better Outcomes from More Rationality. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali; Rafael Pass (ITCS, 2015)

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Dealers. - Hau Chan; Jing Chen 017 (AAMAS, 2016)

Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. - Hau Chan; Jing Chen 017 (AAMAS, 2016)

Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers. - Jing Chen 017; Samuel McCauley; Shikha Singh 002 (ITCS, 2016)

Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (ITCS, 2016)

Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (Games, 2016)

Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare. - Mark Braverman; Jing Chen 017; Sampath Kannan (Math. Oper. Res., 2016)

From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li (CoRR, 2017)

Rational Proofs with Non-Cooperative Provers. - Jing Chen 017; Samuel McCauley; Shikha Singh 002 (CoRR, 2017)

Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. - Hau Chan; Jing Chen 017; Gowtham Srinivasan (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017)

Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li; Pinyan Lu (ICALP, 2018)

Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li (SAGT, 2018)

Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees. - Jing Chen 017; Samuel McCauley; Shikha Singh 002 (SAGT, 2018)

ALGORAND AGREEMENT: Super Fast and Partition Resilient Byzantine Agreement. - Jing Chen 017; Sergey Gorbunov 001; Silvio Micali; Georgios Vlachos (IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2018)

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs. - Jing Chen 017; Samuel McCauley; Shikha Singh 002 (ESA, 2019)

Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li (IJCAI, 2019)

Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods. - Hau Chan; Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Xiaowei Wu 001 (IJCAI, 2019)

Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li (SIAM J. Comput., 2019)

Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger. - Jing Chen 017; Silvio Micali (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2019)

Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037 (WINE, 2021)

Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Extended Abstract). - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li; Pinyan Lu (IJCAI, 2022)

Bayesian auctions with efficient queries. - Jing Chen 017; Bo Li 037; Yingkai Li; Pinyan Lu (Artif. Intell., 2022)