Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments. - Federico Echenique; Antonio Miralles; Jun Zhang 035 (CoRR, 2019)

Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable. - Jun Zhang 035 (J. Econ. Theory, 2019)

A market design approach to job rotation. - Jingsheng Yu; Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? - Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts. - Keisuke Bando; Toshiyuki Hirai; Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2021)

Level-k reasoning in school choice. - Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2021)

Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints. - Federico Echenique; Antonio Miralles; Jun Zhang 035 (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)

Strategy-proof allocation with outside option. - Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)

Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments. - Federico Echenique; Antonio Miralles; Jun Zhang 035 (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)