The value of a player in n-person games. - Kjell Hausken; Matthias Mohr (Soc. Choice Welf., 2001)

Stochastic conditional and unconditional warfare. - Kjell Hausken; John F. Moxnes (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2002)

Formalization of Multi-Level Games. - Kjell Hausken; Ross Cressman (IGTR, 2004)

Returns to information security investment: The effect of alternative information security breach functions on optimal investment and sensitivity to vulnerability. - Kjell Hausken (Inf. Syst. Frontiers, 2006)

Strategic Defense and Attack of Complex Networks. - Kjell Hausken (WEIS, 2007)

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems. - Kjell Hausken (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2008)

Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow. - Kjell Hausken (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems. - Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2008)

Protection vs. redundancy in homogeneous parallel systems. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2008)

False targets efficiency in defense strategy. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2009)

Minmax defense strategy for complex multi-state systems. - Kjell Hausken; Gregory Levitin (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

Protection vs. false targets in series systems. - Kjell Hausken; Gregory Levitin (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

False targets vs. redundancy in homogeneous parallel systems. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

Parallel systems under two sequential attacks. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

Meeting a demand vs. enhancing protections in homogeneous parallel systems. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009)

Redundancy vs. Protection vs. False Targets for Systems Under Attack. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (IEEE Trans. Reliab., 2009)

Redundancy vs. Protection in Defending Parallel Systems Against Unintentional and Intentional Impacts. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (IEEE Trans. Reliab., 2009)

Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2010)

Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2010)

Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems. - Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2010)

Influence of attacker's target recognition ability on defense strategy in homogeneous parallel systems. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2010)

Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures. - Vicki M. Bier; Kjell Hausken (Ann. Oper. Res., 2011)

Active and Passive Defense against Multiple Attack Facilities. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken; Hanoch Ben-Haim (Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res., 2011)

Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels. - Kjell Hausken; Gregory Levitin (Central Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2011)

Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game. - Kjell Hausken; Jun Zhuang 001 (Decis. Anal., 2011)

Defending against multiple different attackers. - Kjell Hausken; Vicki M. Bier (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2011)

Game Theoretic Analysis of Two-Period-Dependent Degraded Multistate Reliability Systems. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2011)

Active vs. Passive Defense against a Strategic Attacker. - Kjell Hausken; Gregory Levitin (IGTR, 2011)

Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers. - Kjell Hausken (Int. J. Syst. Sci., 2011)

Preventive strike vs. false targets and protection in defense strategy. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2011)

Is it wise to protect false targets? - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2011)

On the Impossibility of Deterrence in Sequential Colonel Blotto Games. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2012)

Terrorism risks, civil liberties, and privacy concerns. - Kjell Hausken (Int. J. Crit. Infrastructures, 2012)

The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. - Kjell Hausken; Jun Zhuang 001 (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2012)

Individual versus overarching protection against strategic attacks. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2012)

Parallel systems under two sequential attacks with imperfect detection of the first attack outcome. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2012)

Data survivability vs. security in information systems. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken; Heidi A. Taboada; David W. Coit (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2012)

Combined Series and Parallel Systems subject to Individual versus Overarching Defense and Attack. - Kjell Hausken (Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res., 2013)

Parallel systems under two sequential attacks with contest intensity variation. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Central Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2013)

The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government. - Kjell Hausken; Jun Zhuang 001 (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2013)

Defence resource distribution between protection and decoys for constant resource stockpiling pace. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2013)

Defending and attacking a network of two arcs subject to traffic congestion. - Vicki M. Bier; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2013)

Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected? - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2013)

Defending majority voting systems against a strategic attacker. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken; Hanoch Ben-Haim (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2013)

Individual vs. overarching protection for minimizing the expected damage caused by an attack. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken; Yuanshun Dai (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2013)

Defending Threshold Voting Systems With Identical Voting Units. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (IEEE Trans. Reliab., 2013)

Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets. - Kjell Hausken (Central Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2014)

Returns to information security investment: Endogenizing the expected loss. - Kjell Hausken (Inf. Syst. Frontiers, 2014)

Optimal defense with variable number of overarching and individual protections. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken; Yuanshun Dai (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2014)

A game theoretic model of economic crises. - Jonathan W. Welburn; Kjell Hausken (Appl. Math. Comput., 2015)

Defense strategies for infrastructures with multiple systems of components. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; Jun Zhuang 001 (FUSION, 2016)

Game-theoretic strategies for systems of components using product-form utilities. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; Jun Zhuang 001 (MFI, 2016)

The strategic interaction between a company and the government surrounding disasters. - Kjell Hausken; Jun Zhuang 001 (Ann. Oper. Res., 2016)

How Elections are Impacted by Production, Economic Growth and Conflict. - Kjell Hausken; Mthuli Ncube (IGTR, 2016)

Game-theoretic strategies for asymmetric networked systems. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; David K. Y. Yau; Jun Zhuang 001 (FUSION, 2017)

Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; David K. Y. Yau; Jun Zhuang 001 (MFI, 2017)

On defense strategies for system of systems using aggregated correlations. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Neena Imam; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; Jun Zhuang 001 (SysCon, 2017)

Defense and attack for interdependent systems. - Kjell Hausken (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2017)

Security Investment, Hacking, and Information Sharing between Firms and between Hackers. - Kjell Hausken (Games, 2017)

Information Sharing Among Cyber Hackers in Successive Attacks. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2017)

Special versus general protection and attack of parallel and series components. - Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2017)

Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2018)

Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components. - Nageswara S. V. Rao; Chris Y. T. Ma; Kjell Hausken; Fei He 006; David K. Y. Yau; Jun Zhuang 001 (Sensors, 2018)

Principal-Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle. - Kjell Hausken (Decis. Anal., 2019)

A Game Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation. - Kjell Hausken (Games, 2019)

Defence and attack of complex interdependent systems. - Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2019)

Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations. - Kjell Hausken (Math. Comput. Simul., 2019)

A Two-Period Game Theoretic Model of Zero-Day Attacks with Stockpiling. - Guizhou Wang; Jonathan W. Welburn; Kjell Hausken (Games, 2020)

Game Theoretic Analysis of Insurgent Attacks, Government Protection, and International Intervention. - Kjell Hausken; Mthuli Ncube (Int. J. Strateg. Decis. Sci., 2020)

Cyber resilience in firms, organizations and societies. - Kjell Hausken (Internet Things, 2020)

Game theoretic analysis of ideologically biased clickbait or fake news and real news. - Kjell Hausken (Oper. Res. Decis., 2020)

Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations. - Kjell Hausken (Oper. Res. Decis., 2020)

Governmental Taxation of Households Choosing between a National Currency and a Cryptocurrency. - Guizhou Wang; Kjell Hausken (Games, 2021)

Governments Playing Games and Combating the Dynamics of a Terrorist Organization. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2021)

Attack and Defense Strategies in Cyber War Involving Production and Stockpiling of Zero-Day Cyber Exploits. - Kjell Hausken; Jonathan W. Welburn (Inf. Syst. Frontiers, 2021)

Government intervention to combat the dynamics of terrorist organizations. - Kjell Hausken (J. Oper. Res. Soc., 2021)

The precautionary principle as multi-period games where players have different thresholds for acceptable uncertainty. - Kjell Hausken (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2021)

Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation: A Two-Period Extension. - Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2022)

A Review of Axioms for Group Contest Success Functions. - Kjell Hausken (Int. J. Strateg. Decis. Sci., 2022)

Fifty Years of Operations Research in Defense. - Kjell Hausken (Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2024)

Generalizing the Black and Scholes Equation Assuming Differentiable Noise. - Kjell Hausken; John F. Moxnes (J. Appl. Math., 2024)

A Review of Attacker-Defender Games and Cyber Security. - Kjell Hausken; Jonathan W. Welburn; Jun Zhuang 001 (Games, 2024)

A Review of Game Theory and Risk and Reliability Analysis in Infrastructures and Networks. - Kjell Hausken; Jonathan W. Welburn; Jun Zhuang 001 (Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2025)

When Escalation is Inevitable: A Role of Thresholds in a Counterterrorism Game. - Gregory Levitin; Kjell Hausken (IGTR, 2025)