Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts. - Michael Maschler; Bezalel Peleg; L. S. Shapley (Math. Oper. Res., 1979)

Bankruptcy games. - Imma J. Curiel; Michael Maschler; Stef Tijs (Z. Oper. Research, 1987)

A demand adjustment process. - Elaine Bennett; Michael Maschler; William R. Zame (Int. J. Game Theory, 1997)

The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games. - Daniel Granot; Michael Maschler (Int. J. Game Theory, 1997)

Spanning network games. - Daniel Granot; Michael Maschler (Int. J. Game Theory, 1998)

Unanimity in Voting for voters. - Daniel Granot; Michael Maschler; Jonathan Shalev (IGTR, 2000)

Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution. - Salvador Barberà; Michael Maschler; Jonathan Shalev (Games Econ. Behav., 2001)

My Encounters with John Harsanyi. - Michael Maschler (Games Econ. Behav., 2001)

Voting for voters: the unanimity case. - Daniel Granot; Michael Maschler; Jonathan Shalev (Int. J. Game Theory, 2003)

Book Review: B. Peleg, P. Sudhölter, , Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games (2003) Kluwer Academic, Boston 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages. - Michael Maschler (Games Econ. Behav., 2005)

The nucleolus of a standard tree game revisited: a study of its monotonicity and computational properties. - Michael Maschler; Jos A. M. Potters; Hans Reijnierse (Int. J. Game Theory, 2010)

On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road. - Daniel Granot; Herbert Hamers; Jeroen Kuipers; Michael Maschler (Games Econ. Behav., 2011)