Fully absorbing dynamic compromise. - Michael Richter 001 (J. Econ. Theory, 2014)

Embedding convex geometries and a bound on convex dimension. - Michael Richter 001; Luke G. Rogers (Discret. Math., 2017)

Aspiration-based choice. - Begum Guney; Michael Richter 001; Matan Tsur (J. Econ. Theory, 2018)

Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. - Michael Richter 001 (Games Econ. Behav., 2019)

The permissible and the forbidden. - Michael Richter 001; Ariel Rubinstein (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Ordinal allocation. - Christopher P. Chambers; Michael Richter 001 (Soc. Choice Welf., 2023)

Unilateral stability in matching problems. - Michael Richter 001; Ariel Rubinstein (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)