Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments. - Murat R. Sertel; Ipek Özkal-Sanver (Math. Soc. Sci., 2002)

Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners. - Murat R. Sertel; M. Remzi Sanver (Soc. Choice Welf., 2004)

Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study. - Ayça E. Giritligil Kara; Murat R. Sertel (Soc. Choice Welf., 2005)

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. - Özgür Kibris; Murat R. Sertel (Soc. Choice Welf., 2007)