Non-manipulability in Set-valued and Probabilistic Social Choice Theory. - Patrick Lederer (AAMAS, 2021)

Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions. - Patrick Lederer (IJCAI, 2021)

Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness. - Felix Brandt 001; Patrick Lederer (CoRR, 2021)

The Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Representation in Party-Approval Multi-Winner Elections. - Théo Delemazure; Tom Demeulemeester; Manuel Eberl; Jonas Israel; Patrick Lederer (Arch. Formal Proofs, 2022)

On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions. - Felix Brandt 001; Martin Bullinger; Patrick Lederer (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2022)

Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections. - Théo Delemazure; Tom Demeulemeester; Manuel Eberl; Jonas Israel; Patrick Lederer (AAAI, 2023)

Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains. - Felix Brandt 001; Patrick Lederer; Sascha Tausch (AAMAS, 2023)

Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules. - Chris Dong; Patrick Lederer (AAMAS, 2023)

Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. - Felix Brandt 001; Patrick Lederer; Warut Suksompong (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)

Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections. - Martin Bullinger; Chris Dong; Patrick Lederer; Clara Mehler (AAAI, 2024)

Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules. - Chris Dong; Patrick Lederer (AAAI, 2024)

The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings. - Patrick Lederer; Dominik Peters; Tomasz Was (EC, 2024)

Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results. - Haris Aziz 001; Patrick Lederer; Angus Ritossa (CoRR, 2024)

Sequential Payment Rules: Approximately Fair Budget Divisions via Simple Spending Dynamics. - Haris Aziz 001; Patrick Lederer; Xinhang Lu; Mashbat Suzuki; Jeremy Vollen (CoRR, 2024)

Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule. - Patrick Lederer (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)

Strategic Manipulation in Social Choice Theory. - Patrick Lederer (2024)

Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. - Felix Brandt 001; Patrick Lederer; René Romen (Soc. Choice Welf., 2024)

Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice. - Felix Brandt 001; Patrick Lederer (AAAI, 2025)

The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations. - Fabian Frank; Patrick Lederer (AAMAS, 2025)

Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes. - Haris Aziz 001; Patrick Lederer; Xinhang Lu; Mashbat Suzuki; Jeremy Vollen (EC, 2025)

Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences. - Haris Aziz 001; Patrick Lederer; Dominik Peters; Jannik Peters 001; Angus Ritossa (EC, 2025)

Distance Preservation Games. - Haris Aziz 001; Hau Chan; Patrick Lederer; Shivika Narang; Toby Walsh (CoRR, 2025)