Strategy-proof mechanisms for two-sided matching with minimum and maximum quotas. - Suguru Ueda; Daniel Fragiadakis; Atsushi Iwasaki; Peter Troyan; Makoto Yokoo (AAMAS, 2012)

Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. - Peter Troyan (Games Econ. Behav., 2012)

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas. - Daniel Fragiadakis; Atsushi Iwasaki; Peter Troyan; Suguru Ueda; Makoto Yokoo (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. - Peter Troyan (J. Econ. Theory, 2017)

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority. - Marek Pycia; Peter Troyan (EC, 2019)

Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies. - Daniel Fragiadakis; Peter Troyan (Games Econ. Behav., 2019)

Essentially stable matchings. - Peter Troyan; David Delacrétaz; Andrew Kloosterman (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Obvious manipulations. - Peter Troyan; Thayer Morrill (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process. - Thayer Morrill; Peter Troyan (EC, 2022)

Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment. - Andrew Kloosterman; Peter Troyan (EC, 2023)