Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. - Artem Baklanov; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (AAAI, 2021)

PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. - Artem Baklanov; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001 (IJCAI, 2021)

A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design. - Jason Milionis; Dean Hirsch; Andy Arditi; Pranav Garimidi (DeFi@CCS, 2022)

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. - Eric Balkanski; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Xizhi Tan (SODA, 2022)

When Bidders Are DAOs. - Maryam Bahrani; Pranav Garimidi; Tim Roughgarden (AFT, 2023)

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers. - Maryam Bahrani; Pranav Garimidi; Tim Roughgarden (FC Workshops, 2024)

Centralization in Block-Building and Proposer-Builder Separation. - Maryam Bahrani; Pranav Garimidi; Tim Roughgarden (FC (1), 2024)

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World. - Maryam Bahrani; Pranav Garimidi; Tim Roughgarden (IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2024)

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols. - Pranav Garimidi; Lioba Heimbach; Tim Roughgarden (CoRR, 2025)