Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. - Rica Gonen; Daniel Lehmann 001 (EC, 2000)

Linear Programming helps solving large multi-unit combinatorial auctions - Rica Gonen; Daniel Lehmann 001 (CoRR, 2002)

Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. - Yair Bartal; Rica Gonen; Noam Nisan (TARK, 2003)

Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets. - Rica Gonen (ESA, 2004)

Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets. - Yair Bartal; Rica Gonen; Pierfrancesco La Mura (EC, 2004)

Non-VCG schemes and coalition resistant mechanisms (סכימות שאינן VCG ומכניזמים חסיניי קואליציות.). - Rica Gonen (2005)

Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. - Ittai Abraham; Danny Dolev; Rica Gonen; Joseph Y. Halpern (PODC, 2006)

An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism. - Rica Gonen; Elan Pavlov (PODC, 2007)

Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. - Mira Gonen; Rica Gonen; Elan Pavlov (EC, 2007)

Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. - Yiling Chen 001; Daniel M. Reeves; David M. Pennock; Robin D. Hanson; Lance Fortnow; Rica Gonen (WINE, 2007)

Characterizing Truthful Market Design. - Mira Gonen; Rica Gonen; Elan Pavlov (WINE, 2007)

An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. - Rica Gonen; Elan Pavlov (WINE, 2007)

On the Hardness of Truthful Online Auctions with Multidimensional Constraints. - Rica Gonen (CiE, 2008)

Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability. - Rica Gonen; Sergei Vassilvitskii (WINE, 2008)

Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction. - Rica Gonen; Elan Pavlov (SOFSEM, 2009)

Managing Heterogeneity in Search-advertisers' Objectives. - Nitza Geri; Rica Gonen (MCIS, 2010)

Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker. - Yiling Chen 001; Stanko Dimitrov; Rahul Sami; Daniel M. Reeves; David M. Pennock; Robin D. Hanson; Lance Fortnow; Rica Gonen (Algorithmica, 2010)

The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings. - Rica Gonen; Anat Lerner (Games, 2013)

Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities. - Anat Lerner; Rica Gonen (Games, 2014)

Incentive Compatible Mulit-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach. - Niv Buchbinder; Rica Gonen (Algorithmica, 2015)

Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. - Anat Lerner; Rica Gonen (IGTR, 2015)

Privacy Preserving Computations for Viral Marketing: The Case of Rational Players. - Rica Gonen; Tamir Tassa (ARES, 2016)

Markets with Strategic Multi-minded Mediators. - Moran Feldman; Rica Gonen (CoRR, 2016)

Online Truthful Mechanisms for Multi-sided Markets. - Moran Feldman; Rica Gonen (CoRR, 2016)

Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. - Anat Lerner; Rica Gonen (IGTR, 2016)

Databroker System: A New Online Advertising System That Keeps Users Engaged While Preserving Their Privacy. - Rica Gonen (AAMAS, 2017)

DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced Double-sided Combinatorial Market. - Rica Gonen; Ozi Egri (AAMAS, 2017)

Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms - Two players case. - Rica Gonen; Anat Lerner (Comput., 2017)

Two-Sided Markets: Mapping Social Welfare to Gain from Trade. - Rica Gonen; Ozi Egri (EUMAS, 2018)

Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations. - Moran Feldman; Gonen Frim; Rica Gonen (GameSec, 2018)

Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants. - Moran Feldman; Rica Gonen (SAGT, 2018)

Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space. - Rica Gonen; Anat Lerner (ADT, 2019)

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. - Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAAI, 2020)

COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market. - Rica Gonen; Ozi Egri (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020)

A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. - Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2021)

Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. - Itay Shtechman; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2021)

Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. - Dvir Gilor; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Artif. Intell., 2021)

Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. - Piotr Faliszewski; Rica Gonen; Martin Koutecký; Nimrod Talmon (J. Log. Comput., 2022)

Heuristics for Opinion Diffusion via Local Elections. - Rica Gonen; Martin Koutecký; Roei Menashof; Nimrod Talmon (SOFSEM, 2023)

Correction to: Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. - Piotr Faliszewski; Rica Gonen; Martin Koutecký; Nimrod Talmon (J. Log. Comput., 2023)

Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. - Dvir Gilor; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (Artif. Intell., 2023)

Deep Reinforcement Learning and Influenced Games. - C. Brady; Rica Gonen; G. Rabinovich (IEEE Access, 2024)

Weighted Envy Freeness With Limited Subsidies. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2024)

Weighted Envy Freeness With Bounded Subsidies. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (AAMAS, 2025)

Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Haris Aziz 001; Rica Gonen; Xin Huang; Kei Kimura; Indrajit Saha; Erel Segal-Halevi; Zhaohong Sun 001; Mashbat Suzuki; Makoto Yokoo (CoRR, 2025)

Fair division of the replacement-units without an appraiser in urban renewal processes. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)

Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective? - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)

The Min Max Average Cycle Weight Problem. - Noga Klein Elmalem; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi (CoRR, 2025)