On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules. - Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2014)

Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting. - Haris Aziz 001; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer; Edith Elkind; Rupert Freeman; Toby Walsh (AAAI, 2015)

Crowdsourcing Societal Tradeoffs. - Vincent Conitzer; Markus Brill; Rupert Freeman (AAMAS, 2015)

General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice. - Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2015)

Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners). - Markus Brill; Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2016)

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Yuqian Li 002 (AAAI, 2016)

Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games. - Haifeng Xu; Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer; Shaddin Dughmi; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2016)

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks. - Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (ISAIM, 2016)

On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games. - Rupert Freeman; Samuel Haney; Debmalya Panigrahi (WINE, 2016)

Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share. - Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2016)

Phragmén's Voting Methods and Justified Representation. - Markus Brill; Rupert Freeman; Svante Janson; Martin Lackner (AAAI, 2017)

Crowdsourced Outcome Determination in Prediction Markets. - Rupert Freeman; Sébastien Lahaie; David M. Pennock (AAAI, 2017)

Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings. - Rupert Freeman; Seyed Majid Zahedi; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2017)

Fair Public Decision Making. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (EC, 2017)

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (EC, 2017)

Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions. - Jens Witkowski; Rupert Freeman; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan; David M. Pennock; Andreas Krause 001 (AAAI, 2018)

An Axiomatic View of the Parimutuel Consensus Wagering Mechanism. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock (AAMAS, 2018)

An Axiomatic View of the Parimutuel Consensus Mechanism. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock (IJCAI, 2018)

Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach. - Rupert Freeman; Seyed Majid Zahedi; Vincent Conitzer; Benjamin C. Lee (SIGMETRICS (Abstracts), 2018)

Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (AAAI, 2019)

An Equivalence between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (AAAI, 2019)

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Dominik Peters; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (EC, 2019)

Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods. - Rupert Freeman; Sujoy Sikdar; Rohit Vaish; Lirong Xia (IJCAI, 2019)

Preventing Arbitrage from Collusion When Eliciting Probabilities. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Dominik Peters; Bo Waggoner (AAAI, 2020)

Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Chores. - Rupert Freeman; Sujoy Sikdar; Rohit Vaish; Lirong Xia (AAMAS, 2020)

No-Regret and Incentive-Compatible Online Learning. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Chara Podimata; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (ICML, 2020)

Proportionality in Approval-Based Elections With a Variable Number of Winners. - Rupert Freeman; Anson Kahng; David M. Pennock (IJCAI, 2020)

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation. - Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001; Rohit Vaish (EC, 2020)

Two-Sided Matching Meets Fair Division. - Rupert Freeman; Evi Micha; Nisarg Shah 001 (IJCAI, 2021)

Towards a Theory of Confidence in Market-Based Predictions. - Rupert Freeman; David M. Pennock; Daniel M. Reeves; David M. Rothschild; Bo Waggoner (ISIPTA, 2021)

Efficient Resource Allocation with Secretive Agents. - Soroush Ebadian; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (IJCAI, 2022)

Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation. - Rupert Freeman; Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin (AAAI, 2024)

Harm Ratio: A Novel and Versatile Fairness Criterion. - Soroush Ebadian; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (EAAMO, 2024)

Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms. - Mark de Berg; Rupert Freeman; Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin; Markus Utke (CoRR, 2024)

Best of Both Worlds: Ex Ante and Ex Post Fairness in Resource Allocation. - Haris Aziz 001; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001; Rohit Vaish (Oper. Res., 2024)

An Equivalence Between Fair Division and Wagering Mechanisms. - Rupert Freeman; Jens Witkowski; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan; David M. Pennock (Manag. Sci., 2024)

Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms. - Rupert Freeman; Geoffrey Pritchard; Mark C. Wilson (AAMAS, 2025)

Reallocating Wasted Votes in Proportional Parliamentary Elections with Thresholds. - Théo Delemazure; Rupert Freeman; Jérôme Lang; Jean-François Laslier; Dominik Peters (EC, 2025)