Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution. - Salvador Barberà; Michael Maschler; Jonathan Shalev (Games Econ. Behav., 2001)

Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences. - Salvador Barberà; Bhaskar Dutta; Arunava Sen (J. Econ. Theory, 2001)

An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. - Salvador Barberà (Soc. Choice Welf., 2001)

Self-Selection Consistent Functions. - Salvador Barberà; Carmen Beviá (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] - Salvador Barberà; Anke Gerber (Math. Soc. Sci., 2003)

On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. - Salvador Barberà; Anke Gerber (Math. Soc. Sci., 2003)

Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]. - Salvador Barberà; Bhaskar Dutta; Arunava Sen (J. Econ. Theory, 2005)

Voting by committees under constraints. - Salvador Barberà; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme (J. Econ. Theory, 2005)

Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation. - Salvador Barberà; Carmen Beviá (Games Econ. Behav., 2006)

Michael Maschler in Barcelona. - Salvador Barberà (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

How to choose a non-controversial list with k names. - Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho (Soc. Choice Welf., 2008)

A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler. - Shmuel Zamir; Salvador Barberà (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

On the rule of k names. - Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho (Games Econ. Behav., 2010)

Memorial. - Salvador Barberà; Shmuel Zamir (Int. J. Game Theory, 2010)

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (J. Econ. Theory, 2010)

Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result. - Salvador Barberà; Bernardo Moreno (Games Econ. Behav., 2011)

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule. - Salvador Barberà; Lars Ehlers (Soc. Choice Welf., 2011)

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Games Econ. Behav., 2012)

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Int. J. Game Theory, 2012)

Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Soc. Choice Welf., 2012)

Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (MDAI, 2013)

Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations. - Salvador Barberà; Carmen Beviá; Clara Ponsati (Games Econ. Behav., 2015)

Balancing the power to appoint officers. - Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Immunity to credible deviations from the truth. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Math. Soc. Sci., 2017)

Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Soc. Choice Welf., 2020)

Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities. - Salvador Barberà; Walter Bossert; Kotaro Suzumura (Soc. Choice Welf., 2021)

Information disclosure with many alternatives. - Salvador Barberà; Antonio Nicolò (Soc. Choice Welf., 2021)

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models. - Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited. - Salvador Barberà; Walter Bossert (J. Econ. Theory, 2023)