Internet auctions with many traders. - Michael Peters; Sergei Severinov (J. Econ. Theory, 2006)

Mechanism design with partial state verifiability. - Raymond Deneckere; Sergei Severinov (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus. - Grigory Kosenok; Sergei Severinov (J. Econ. Theory, 2008)

An efficient solution to the informed principal problem. - Sergei Severinov (J. Econ. Theory, 2008)

Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers. - Alexei Boulatov; Sergei Severinov (Games Econ. Behav., 2021)

Who wants to be an auctioneer? - Sergei Severinov; Gábor Virág (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)