Dynamic matching market design. - Mohammad Akbarpour; Shengwu Li; Shayan Oveis Gharan (EC, 2014)

Credible Mechanisms. - Mohammad Akbarpour; Shengwu Li (EC, 2018)

Belief updating and the demand for information. - Sandro Ambuehl; Shengwu Li (Games Econ. Behav., 2018)

Context-dependent choice as explained by foraging theory. - Shengwu Li; Ning Neil Yu (J. Econ. Theory, 2018)

Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms. - Mohammad Akbarpour; Scott Duke Kominers; Shengwu Li; Paul R. Milgrom (EC, 2021)

On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. - Louis Golowich; Shengwu Li (CoRR, 2021)

Simplicity in mechanism design: an annotated reading list. - Shengwu Li (SIGecom Exch., 2021)

The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets. - Mohammad Akbarpour; Yeganeh Alimohammadi; Shengwu Li; Amin Saberi (EC, 2022)

Learning spatial self-attention information for visual tracking. - Shengwu Li; Xuande Zhang; Jing Xiong; Chenjing Ning; Mingke Zhang (IET Image Process., 2022)