Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good. - Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa (J. Econ. Theory, 2000)

Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies. - Shigehiro Serizawa (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. - Shigehiro Serizawa; John A. Weymark (J. Econ. Theory, 2003)

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies. - Hideyuki Mizobuchi; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2006)

Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation. - Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2006)

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods. - Kentaro Hatsumi; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2009)

An impossibility theorem for matching problems. - Shohei Takagi; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2010)

Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity. - Itai Ashlagi; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2012)

A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents. - Shuhei Morimoto; Shigehiro Serizawa; Stephen Ching (Soc. Choice Welf., 2013)

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model. - Kentaro Hatsumi; Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa (Int. J. Game Theory, 2014)

Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences. - Tomoya Kazumura; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2016)

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule. - Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa (Games Econ. Behav., 2018)

Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. - Tomoya Kazumura; Debasis Mishra; Shigehiro Serizawa (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples. - Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects. - Ryosuke Sakai; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2023)

Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in package assignment problems with money. - Hiroki Shinozaki; Shigehiro Serizawa (EC, 2025)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem. - Shurojit Chatterji; Jordi Massó; Shigehiro Serizawa (Games Econ. Behav., 2025)

Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function. - Shigehiro Serizawa; John A. Weymark (Games Econ. Behav., 2025)

A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices. - Yuya Wakabayashi; Ryosuke Sakai; Shigehiro Serizawa (Games Econ. Behav., 2025)