New upper bound on block sensitivity and certificate complexity in terms of sensitivity. - Andris Ambainis; Yihan Gao; Jieming Mao; Xiaoming Sun 001; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2013)

On the sensitivity complexity of bipartite graph properties. - Yihan Gao; Jieming Mao; Xiaoming Sun 001; Song Zuo (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2013)

Tighter Relations Between Sensitivity and Other Complexity Measures. - Andris Ambainis; Mohammad Bavarian; Yihan Gao; Jieming Mao; Xiaoming Sun 001; Song Zuo (Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2014)

Optimal Machine Strategies to Commit to in Two-Person Repeated Games. - Song Zuo; Pingzhong Tang (AAAI, 2015)

Randomized Assignments for Barter Exchanges: Fairness vs. Efficiency. - Wenyi Fang; Aris Filos-Ratsikas; Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (ADT, 2015)

Digital Good Exchange: (Extended Abstract). - Wenyi Fang; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (AAMAS, 2016)

Digital Good Exchange. - Wenyi Fang; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (IJCAI, 2016)

Dynamic Auctions with Bank Accounts. - Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (IJCAI, 2016)

Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts. - Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2016)

Fans Economy and All-Pay Auctions with Proportional Allocations. - Pingzhong Tang; Yulong Zeng; Song Zuo (AAAI, 2017)

Dynamic Revenue Sharing. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Max Lin; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (NIPS, 2017)

Optimal Vehicle Dispatching Schemes via Dynamic Pricing. - Mengjing Chen; Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2017)

Generalizing Virtual Values to Multidimensional Auctions: a Non-Myersonian Approach. - Song Zuo (CoRR, 2017)

Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments. - Weiran Shen; Zihe Wang 001; Song Zuo (IJCAI, 2018)

Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design. - Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (EC, 2018)

Optimal Vehicle Dispatching for Ride-sharing Platforms via Dynamic Pricing. - Mengjing Chen; Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (WWW (Companion Volume), 2018)

Incentive-Aware Learning for Large Markets. - Alessandro Epasto; Mohammad Mahdian; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (WWW, 2018)

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field. - Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Rita Ren; Song Zuo (WWW, 2018)

Computer-aided mechanism design: designing revenue-optimal mechanisms via neural networks. - Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2018)

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers. - Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (AAAI, 2019)

Learning Optimal Strategies to Commit To. - Binghui Peng; Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (AAAI, 2019)

Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks. - Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (AAMAS, 2019)

Dispatching Through Pricing: Modeling Ride-Sharing and Designing Dynamic Prices. - Mengjing Chen; Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (IJCAI, 2019)

Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (SODA, 2019)

The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance? - Yulong Zeng; Song Zuo (WWW, 2019)

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions. - Zihe Wang 001; Weiran Shen; Song Zuo (AAMAS, 2020)

A Data-Driven Metric of Incentive Compatibility. - Yuan Deng; Sébastien Lahaie; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (WWW, 2020)

Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing. - Yuan Deng; Sébastien Lahaie; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (ICML, 2021)

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (NeurIPS, 2021)

The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (EC, 2021)

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond. - Yuan Deng; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (EC, 2021)

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (SODA, 2021)

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World. - Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (WWW, 2021)

Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach. - Dirk Bergemann; Paul Duetting; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2021)

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab S. Mirrokni; Song Zuo (EC, 2022)

Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. - Dirk Bergemann; Paul Dütting; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (WWW, 2022)

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Vahab Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Song Zuo (Oper. Res., 2022)

Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs. - Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Hanrui Zhang 001; Song Zuo (WWW, 2023)

Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auction. - Junjie Chen; Minming Li; Haifeng Xu; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2023)

GFANet: Gated Fusion Attention Network for skin lesion segmentation. - Shihan Qiu; Chengfei Li; Yue Feng 004; Song Zuo; Huijie Liang; Ao Xu (Comput. Biol. Medicine, 2023)

Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. - Junjie Chen; Minming Li; Haifeng Xu; Song Zuo (ICALP, 2024)

Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency. - Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Hanrui Zhang 001; Song Zuo (NeurIPS, 2024)

Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World. - Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Hanrui Zhang 001; Song Zuo (NeurIPS, 2024)

Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Song Zuo (EC, 2024)

Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems. - Renato Paes Leme; Georgios Piliouras; Jon Schneider; Kelly Spendlove; Song Zuo (EC, 2024)

Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers. - Yuan Deng; Mohammad Mahdian; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Hanrui Zhang 001; Song Zuo (WWW, 2024)

Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study. - Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Yifeng Teng; Song Zuo (WWW, 2024)

Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. - Paul Dütting; Vahab Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Haifeng Xu; Song Zuo (WWW, 2024)

Dynamical Analysis of Autobidding Systems. - Renato Paes Leme; Georgios Piliouras; Jon Schneider; Kelly Spendlove; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2024)

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization. - Yuan Deng; Amin Karbasi; Vahab Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Grigoris Velegkas; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2024)

Auto-Bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey. - Gagan Aggarwal; Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru; Santiago R. Balseiro; Kshipra Bhawalkar; Yuan Deng; Zhe Feng 004; Gagan Goel; Christopher Liaw; Haihao Lu; Mohammad Mahdian; Jieming Mao; Aranyak Mehta; et al. (SIGecom Exch., 2024)

AI-Driven Mechanism Design - Weiran Shen; Pingzhong Tang; Song Zuo (Springer, 2024)

Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information. - Dirk Bergemann; Marek Bojko; Paul Duetting; Renato Paes Leme; Haifeng Xu; Song Zuo (EC, 2025)

A Reduction from Multi-Parameter to Single-Parameter Bayesian Contract Design. - Matteo Castiglioni; Junjie Chen; Minming Li; Haifeng Xu; Song Zuo (SODA, 2025)

The impact of multi-class information decoupling in latent space on skin lesion segmentation. - Qibo Zhang; Chengfei Li; Song Zuo; Yufei Cai; Ao Xu; Haijian Huang; Shiqin Zhou (Neurocomputing, 2025)

Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content. - Santiago R. Balseiro; Kshipra Bhawalkar; Yuan Deng; Zhe Feng 004; Jieming Mao; Aranyak Mehta; Vahab Mirrokni; Renato Paes Leme; Di Wang 005; Song Zuo (CoRR, 2025)