Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents. - Sophie Klumper; Guido Schäfer (SAGT, 2022)

To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model. - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi; Sophie Klumper; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (EC, 2024)

Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games. - Adrian Haret; Sophie Klumper; Jan Maly 001; Guido Schäfer (EC, 2024)

Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions. - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi; Sophie Klumper; Twan Kroll; Stefano Leonardi 001; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (CoRR, 2025)

Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. - Georgios Amanatidis; Sophie Klumper; Evangelos Markakis; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2025)