Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges. - Steven J. Brams; Morton D. Davis (Oper. Res., 1978)

Letter to the Editor - Authors' Rejoinder. - Steven J. Brams; Morton D. Davis (Oper. Res., 1980)

Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries. - Steven J. Brams; Morton D. Davis (Math. Soc. Sci., 1982)

Optimal Threats. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour (Oper. Res., 1987)

Game Theory and National Security. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour (Wiley, 1988)

On Envy-Free Cake Division. - Steven J. Brams (J. Comb. Theory A, 1995)

Fair division - from cake-cutting to dispute resolution. - Steven J. Brams; Alan D. Taylor (Cambridge University Press, 1996)

Agreement through Threats: the Northern Ireland Case. - Steven J. Brams; Jeffrey M. Togman (IGTR, 1999)

The win-win solution - guaranteeing fair shares to everybody. - Steven J. Brams; Alan D. Taylor (W. W. Norton & Company, 2000)

Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity. - Steven J. Brams; Peter C. Fishburn (Soc. Choice Welf., 2000)

A nail-biting election. - Steven J. Brams; Peter C. Fishburn (Soc. Choice Welf., 2001)

Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? - Walter Bossert; Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour (Games Econ. Behav., 2002)

Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; D. Marc Kilgour (TARK, 2003)

Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond. - Julius B. Barbanel; Steven J. Brams (Math. Soc. Sci., 2004)

Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting. - Steven J. Brams; Peter C. Fishburn (Soc. Choice Welf., 2005)

Approval voting, 2nd edition. - Steven J. Brams; Peter C. Fishburn (Springer, 2007)

Superior beings - if they exist, how would we know: game-theoretic implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, 2nd edition. - Steven J. Brams (Springer, 2007)

Mathematics and democracy - designing better voting and fair-division procedures. - Steven J. Brams (Princeton University Press, 2007)

Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; Christian Klamler (Fair Division, 2007)

Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; Christian Klamler (Fair Division, 2007)

07261 Summary – Fair Division. - Steven J. Brams; Kirk Pruhs (Fair Division, 2007)

07261 Abstracts Collection – Fair Division. - Steven J. Brams; Kirk Pruhs (Fair Division, 2007)

The Presidential Election Game, 2nd edition. - Steven J. Brams (CRC Press, 2008)

Proportional pie-cutting. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; Christian Klamler (Int. J. Game Theory, 2008)

Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures. - Steven J. Brams (Math. Comput. Model., 2008)

Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference. - Steven J. Brams; M. Remzi Sanver (The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, 2009)

Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake. - Julius B. Barbanel; Steven J. Brams; Walter Stromquist (Am. Math. Mon., 2009)

Fair Division*. - Steven J. Brams (Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009)

A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share. - Stergios Athanassoglou; Steven J. Brams; Jay Sethuraman (Math. Soc. Sci., 2010)

Game Theory and the Humanities - Bridging Two Worlds. - Steven J. Brams (MIT Press, 2011)

Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargaining. - D. Marc Kilgour; Steven J. Brams; Todd R. Kaplan (TARK, 2011)

Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; Christian Klamler (SIAM Rev., 2011)

On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions. - Steven J. Brams; Michal Feldman; John K. Lai; Jamie Morgenstern; Ariel D. Procaccia (AAAI, 2012)

The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour; Christian Klamler (Soc. Choice Welf., 2012)

Game Theory and Politics. - Steven J. Brams (Dover Publications, 2013)

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour (Soc. Choice Welf., 2013)

N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division. - Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; Christian Klamler (Am. Math. Mon., 2013)

Making the Rules of Sports Fairer. - Steven J. Brams; Mehmet S. Ismail (SIAM Rev., 2018)

Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive. - Steven J. Brams; Mehmet S. Ismail; D. Marc Kilgour; Walter Stromquist (Am. Math. Mon., 2018)

A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour (Games, 2020)

Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black. - Steven J. Brams; Mehmet S. Ismail (CoG, 2021)

Peter C. Fishburn (1936-2021). - Steven J. Brams; William V. Gehrlein; Fred S. Roberts (Soc. Choice Welf., 2021)

Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936-2021). - Steven J. Brams; William V. Gehrlein; Fred S. Roberts (Discret. Appl. Math., 2022)

Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible. - Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour; Christian Klamler (Oper. Res. Forum, 2022)

The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes. - Steven J. Brams; Markus Brill; Anne-Marie George (Soc. Choice Welf., 2022)