Ex Post Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction When Demand Can Be Arbitrarily Larger Than Supply. - Eleftherios Zacharias; Steven R. Williams (J. Econ. Theory, 2001)

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design. - Stefan Krasa; Steven R. Williams (J. Econ. Theory, 2007)

Common Value Auctions with a Profit Sharing Contract - Vineet Abhishek; Bruce E. Hajek; Steven R. Williams (CoRR, 2011)

Auctions with a profit sharing contract. - Vineet Abhishek; Bruce E. Hajek; Steven R. Williams (Games Econ. Behav., 2013)

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions. - Mark Satterthwaite; Steven R. Williams; Konstantinos E. Zachariadis (Games Econ. Behav., 2014)

On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence. - Vineet Abhishek; Bruce E. Hajek; Steven R. Williams (Games Econ. Behav., 2015)

Price discovery using a double auction. - Mark Satterthwaite; Steven R. Williams; Konstantinos E. Zachariadis (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)