Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Philip A. Haile; John G. Riley (Games Econ. Behav., 2002)

The Package Assignment Model. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Joseph M. Ostroy (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Ascending price Vickrey auctions. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Joseph M. Ostroy (Games Econ. Behav., 2006)

Duality in combinatorial auctions. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Joseph M. Ostroy (SIGecom Exch., 2007)

Ascending auctions for integral (poly)matroids with concave nondecreasing separable values. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Sven de Vries; James Schummer; Rakesh V. Vohra (SODA, 2008)

Information acquisition and full surplus extraction. - Sushil Bikhchandani (J. Econ. Theory, 2010)

An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Sven de Vries; James Schummer; Rakesh V. Vohra (Oper. Res., 2011)

Decreasing Marginal Value of Information Under Symmetric Loss. - Sushil Bikhchandani; John W. Mamer (Decis. Anal., 2013)

Transitive regret over statistically independent lotteries. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Uzi Segal (J. Econ. Theory, 2014)

Stability with one-sided incomplete information. - Sushil Bikhchandani (J. Econ. Theory, 2017)

Rank-Preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Debasis Mishra (CoRR, 2022)

Selling two identical objects. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Debasis Mishra (J. Econ. Theory, 2022)

Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models. - Sushil Bikhchandani; Debasis Mishra (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)