Partially Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Assignment Problem - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2013)

An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (EC, 2014)

The Naive versus the Adaptive Boston Mechanism. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2014)

Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (SIGecom Exch., 2014)

The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms. - Timo Mennle; Michael Weiss 004; Basil Philipp; Sven Seuken (IJCAI, 2015)

The Efficient Frontier in Randomized Social Choice. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2015)

The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (EC, 2016)

First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. - Umut Mert Dur; Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (EC, 2018)

Local Sufficiency for Partial Strategyproofness. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2020)

Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2020)

An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (CoRR, 2020)

Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. - Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)